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NOTIFICATION OF DATA SECURITY BREACHES
Paul M. Schwartz*
Edward J. Janger**
The law increasingly requires private companies to disclose information
for the benefit of consumers. The latest examples of such regulation are
state and federal laws that require companies to notify individuals of data
security incidents involving their personal information. These laws, pro-
posed in the wake of highly publicized data spills, seek to punish the
breached entity and to protect consumers by requiring the entity to notify
its customers about the security breach. There are competing approaches,
however to how the law is to mandate release of information about data
leaks. This Article finds that the current statutes'focus on reputational
sanction is incomplete. An important function of breach notification is
mitigation of harm after a data leak. This function requires a multi-
institutional coordinated response of the kind that is absent from current
policy proposals. This Article advocates creation of a coordinated re-
sponse architecture and develops the elements of such an approach.
Central to this architecture is a coordinated response agent (CRA) that
oversees steps for automatic consumer protection and heightens mitiga-
tion. This Article also proposes a bifurcated notice scheme that lets firms
know that the CRA is watching and is scrutinizing their decision whether
or not to disclose information about a breach to the affected individuals.
Moreover the CRA will set in motion automatic protective measures on
behalf of the breached consumers. Finally, the CRA will regulate the con-
tent of notification messages to reflect the nature of the data breach.
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INTRODUCTION
The law increasingly requires private companies to disclose certain in-
formation for the benefit of consumers. Hospitals must publicize
performance results for certain medical procedures.' Manufacturers of
household appliances must label their products with energy-efficiency rat-
ings.2 Factories must disclose information about toxic releases and
workplace injuries. Writing in 1999, Cass Sunstein termed this trend "regu-
lation through disclosure" and characterized it as "one of the most striking
developments in the last generation of American law.
' 4
The latest example of regulation through disclosure is a requirement that
companies notify individuals of data security incidents involving their per-
sonal information. Leading the nation, California enacted the first breach
disclosure statute, S.B. 1386, which took effect in 2003.' The California
statute requires a breached entity to perform certain actions after a security
breach involving personally identifiable consumer information. Most impor-
tantly, the breached organization must notify affected individuals and self-
identify as the party responsible for the data leak.6 Following a series of
highly publicized data spills, thirty-three other states and one major metro-
.• 7
politan area, New York City, have enacted similar legislation, and Senator
Dianne Feinstein has proposed federal legislation based on the California
1. For analysis of this process of publicizing hospital performance results, see Aaron Twer-
ski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each
Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1999).
2. Regarding the energy efficiency ratings, see, for example, About Energy Star,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab-index (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
3. Regarding information about toxic releases and workplace injuries, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Information Regulation and Information Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 614
(1999).
4. Id. at 613.
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, .82, .84 (West Supp. 2006).
6. Id. § 1798.82.
7. See Appendix. For a discussion of legislative developments at the state level, see Brian
Krebs, States Keep Watchful Eye on Personal-Data Firms, June 1, 2005, WASH. POST, at AI.
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law.' These statutes seek to punish the breached entity and protect consum-
ers by mandating corporate information disclosure.
There are also critics of this approach. A major objection is that the cur-
rent requirement for customer notice generates too many breach disclosure
letters.9 Critics focus on the disclosure trigger in the California statute and
related legislation which requires the sending of notification letters when-
ever there is a reasonable likelihood that an unauthorized party has
"acquired" personal information. These critics point to Aesop's fable, "The
Boy who Cried Wolf." As Fred Cate writes, "if the California law were
adopted nationally, like the boy who cried wolf, the flood of notices would
soon teach consumers to ignore them. When real danger threatened, who
would listen?"' ° The Washington Post has joined this chorus in editorializing
against these laws as creating "tedious warnings" that will cause people to
"ignore the whole lot.""II
A federal guideline for breach notification by financial institutions pro-
poses an alternative paradigm. This document, the Interagency Guidance,
takes a two-track approach. Its first track uses a higher disclosure trigger for
customer notice: the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of "mis-
use" of the leaked personal information. 2 Its second track uses a lower
trigger for notice to the financial institution's supervisory regulatory agency:
the test here is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of "unauthorized
access" to the breached data.'3 The idea is that a breach letter should not be
sent to the affected public unless there is a more significant likelihood of
harm. Some observers reject this approach, however, as creating an oppor-
tunity for obstruction and delay; they defend the California statute's lower
threshold for consumer notification.'
4
Thus, the policy debate about notification considers, among other con-
cerns, the best way to mandate the release of information about data leaks in
8. Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 751, 109th Cong. (2005). As an interna-
tional example, Japan is the first nation to include a breach notification requirement in a federal law.
For a discussion, see Miriam Wugmeister et al., What You Need to Know About Japan's New Law
Concerning the Protection of Personal Information, http://www.mofo.coml/mofodev/news/
updates/files/update02019.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
9. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Another notice isn't answer, USA TODAY, Feb. 27, 2005, at 14A,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/2005-02-27-consumer-protection-oppose x
.htm; Editorial, Have You Been Stolen?, WASH. POST, June 30, 2005, at A22 [hereinafter Have You
Been Stolen?].
10. Cate, supra note 9.
11. Have You Been Stolen?, supra note 9.
12. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,743 (Mar. 29, 2005).
13. Id. at 15,741.
14. See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Do Banks and Other Businesses Have a Duty to Notify Cus-
tomers of Computer Security Breaches?, FINDLAW (July 13, 2005), http://writ.news.findlaw.corn-
ramasastry/20050713.html. For an editorial in favor of the California statute's approach, see Edito-
rial, USA TODAY, Few companies have to tell when identity thieves strike, Feb. 28, 2005, at 14A.
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the private sector. 5 The stakes for consumers are high-a single data spill
may compromise the personal data of millions of individuals. 6 The stakes
are also high for companies: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has en-
gaged in high-profile enforcement actions involving a multimillion dollar
settlement in one case, 7 and data leaks, once exposed, will negatively affect
customer trust in the breached entity. 8 Yet the jurisprudential issues involved
in breach notification have been left largely unexplored. This lack of atten-
tion is unsurprising given that little was known about such failures until
recently. In the past, companies were able to keep tight control of informa-
tion about their data security failures.' 9 Put differently, there was no
perceived need for scholars to think about the jurisprudence of breach noti-
fication until California and other states mandated such disclosure and
heightened the public's awareness of data security.
A significant focus of the emerging legal regime has been to impose a
reputational sanction on breached entities. By forcing a breached firm to
notify the consumers whose data have been lost, the law imposes a reputa-
tional cost on this entity.20 However, breach notification serves another, often
overlooked function: it can help both customers and business entities miti-
gate the harm caused by a leak. We seek to distinguish the different aspects
15. Two important caveats about the scope of this Article are required. First, it concentrates
on data security breaches in the private sector. To be sure, the government and other public sector
entities, such as state universities, also maintain large databases containing sensitive information
about individuals, including their Social Security Numbers (SSNs), tax records, healthcare records,
educational records, and other important personal data. See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA
L. REV. 553 (1995). Some of this Article's analysis may hold promise for the public as well as the
private sector. Nevertheless, the role of reputational sanctions and other incentives are likely to
differ in important ways in the private and public sectors. As a result, we reserve examination of
issues of data security for governmental databases for another day.
Second, we do not attempt to reinvent the overall system for verification of identity in the
United States in this Article. Ambitious and competing academic proposals have been made in this
area. See Lynn LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEXAS L.
REV. 89, 114-30 (2001); Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy; and the Architecture of Vulner-
ability, 54 HASTINGs L.J. 1227, 1243-51 (2003). We are not fully convinced by these existing
proposals, however, and choose to concentrate on one area-the issue of informing consumers of
data leaks involving their information.
16. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse has been keeping a running tally of data leaks since
early 2005. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Chronology of Data Breaches Since the ChoicePoint
Incident, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches. htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
17. News Release, FTC, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges (Jan. 26, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01l/choicepoint.htm [hereinafter ChoicePoint News Re-
lease].
18. For a discussion of the negative impact of data leaks on consumer trust, see PONEMON
INST., NATIONAL SURVEY ON DATA SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION 2-4 (2005).
19. Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57
S.C. L. REV. 255, 265 (2005).
20. Bruce Schneier, a prominent security expert, refers to the method of these statutes as
relying on "the 'public shaming' method of security enhancement." Tom Zeller Jr., The Scramble to
Protect Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at Cl (noting how many companies persist in
sending sensitive data using "tapes and trucks").
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of breach notification and to identify trade-offs that arise when a notification
approach emphasizes one or another.
This Article argues that the reputational sanction from breach notifica-
tion can be important, but not for the reasons conventionally discussed.
Moreover, mitigation of harms after a breach, another important function of
breach notification, requires a multi-institutional, coordinated response of
the kind that is absent from current policy proposals. To fill this gap, this
Article advocates creation of a coordinated response architecture as well as
a critical organization, the Coordinated Response Agent (CRA). 21 In brief,
this Article argues for greater automatic protection for consumers, clearer
consumer notification, coordinated sharing of information about data inci-
dents among affected entities, and heightened oversight of the decision by
breached entities whether to inform consumers or other entities.
I. How WE LIVE Now: THE NEW RISK ENVIRONMENT OF
DATA SECURITY BREACHES AND IDENTITY THEFT
Newsweek has identified a new category of "Letters You Never Want to
See. 22 The old kind of letter informed one of a tax audit, rejection from a
college, or bad news about a cholesterol reading.23 The new kind of letter
reveals a security breach involving one's personal information. Newsweek
calls such a missive the "pain letter."24 No one is immune from being a re-
cipient of such a missive; even the chairman of the FTC, an agency that has
an important oversight role over identity fraud, has received such a notifica-
26tion letter.25 Data spills have occurred for years, but the awareness of data
security problems has been heightened by new state laws and a federal regu-
lation that obliges breached companies to mail these "pain letters."
This Part examines the regulatory landscape for firms that process per-
sonal data. In a short period of approximately three years, the United States
has created significant legal obligations to implement reasonable data secu-
rity practices for an increasing number of companies. In Section I.A, we
consider the legal sources of the requirement of reasonable data security.
One of the striking elements of this requirement is the extent to which it
represents a delegation of regulation that mixes broad standards ("reason-
able data security") with sometimes quite precise rules (whether for certain
21. See infra Section IV.A.
22. Steven Levy & Brad Stone, Grand Theft Identity, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 2005, at 38, avail-
able at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8359692/site/newsweek/.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 40. Newsweek notes that this kind of letter informs its recipient that "[slomeone
may have taken possession of your credit-card info, Social Security number, bank account or other
personal data that would enable him or her to go on a permanent shopping spree-leaving you to
deal with the financial, legal and psychic bills." Id. at 38.
25. Id. at 40.
26. See, e.g., ID ANALYTICS, NATIONAL DATA BREACH ANALYSIS 6 (2006) ("Most likely,
breaches occurred for years prior to the passage of SB 1386 [the California Breach statute] and were
simply not reported.").
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kinds of outside audits, password policies, or staffing requirements). This
approach both delegates discretion to the regulated entity and requires it to
meet sometimes highly specific legal requirements.
The puzzle that this Article seeks to solve is the likely impact of breach
notification on the process of providing data security for personal data. As
part of answering this question, we must think about how firms decide how
much data security is "reasonable." Section I.B discusses different factors
that will shape a company's culture of compliance.
A. The Legal Environment for Data Security
While many entities are under a duty to follow reasonable practices for
data security, the legal sources of this obligation vary from firm to firm. Be-
cause the law gives some leeway in specifying what is reasonable, the
regulated entity as well as the specific data processing industry can have a
role in shaping the norms of appropriate data security. The obligation of
"reasonable" data security represents an example of "delegated regulation."
Regarding this concept, a number of scholars have analyzed the fashion in
which the government delegates important decisions about the pursuit of
public goals to private firms as well as industry organizations. As Jody
Freeman argues, "[p]rivate actors are deeply involved in regulation, service
provision, policy design, and implementation. 27 Or, as Kenneth Bamberger
proposes, a consequence of this delegation of authority is that regulated
firms should be viewed as part of the administrative process."
Delegated regulation does not permit firms to make unfettered decisions.
But it should be contrasted with the "command and control" approach, in
which the government mandates highly specific targets, and regulated enti-
• 29
ties either obey or suffer civil and/or criminal penalties. Delegated
regulation involves a more fluid process. 30 The government and the regulated
3'
entity, in effect, negotiate certain elements of governance.
There is also a particular twist for delegated regulation in the law of data
security. This area of law delegates by drawing on a mixture of both stan-
32dards and rules. A standard mandates a decision based on either an
27. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551
(2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role]; see Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms
Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1290 (2003) (discussing private actors' need to
determine "when it makes sense to condition private participation in service delivery upon adher-
ence to public law norms, and figuring out how best to implement appropriate terms").
28. Kenneth Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private firms, Decision-making and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 384 (2006); see Gillian E. Metzger,
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003).
29. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by hicentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80 Tx.
L. REV. 531, 531-33 (2002).
30. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 27, at 551-53.
31. Bamberger, supra note 28, at 398.
32. For an introduction to the jurisprudence of standards and rules, see, for example, Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Paul M.
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open-ended decision-making principle or a multifactor test. A rule limits
discretion through hard-edged decisional criterion. A classic illustration of
this dichotomy considers the possibilities for regulating the behavior of an
automobile driver at a train crossing: (1) proceed with reasonable caution
(the standard); or (2) stop, look, and listen (the rule)." The law of data secu-
rity creates leeway for the regulated entity through its mixture of standards
and rules. We examine the regulations for data security in the United States
according to a typology based on the nature of the breached entity. Our cate-
gories are (1) Business to Consumer-Financial (B2C-Financial); (2)
Business to Consumer-Retail (B2C-Retail) and other non-financial entities;
(3) outsourcing entities; and (4) data brokers.
1. B2C-Financial
Financial institutions in the United States face explicit regulations for
data security. Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act) requires
financial institutions to develop procedures for protecting the security of
customer data and empowers the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, and other bank regulatory agencies to promulgate data securityS 34
regulations. These agencies have, in turn, issued two "Interagency Guid-
ances" pursuant to the GLB Act; one requires financial institutions to
maintain reasonable data security, and the other requires them to develop a
formal response program to deal with data security breaches."
The GLB Act's security regulations oblige companies to use any appro-
priate measures reasonably designed to protect "the security and
3,6
confidentiality of customer information." The regulations also articulate
certain rules: a financial institution is required to conduct periodic risk as-
sessments, develop a data security program to manage and control risks,
apply sanctions against employees that fail to comply with the data security
program, and use disclosure and other safeguards when security breaches do
occur.37 The ultimate test remains a broad one, that of reasonableness.38
Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 655-57 (2002); Edward J.
Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 559 (2001); Edward J. Janger,
Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1801, 1871-72 (2003).
33. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 655.
34. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 6801, 6805 (2000).
35. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,743 (Mar. 29, 2005); Interagency Guid-
ance Establishing Information Security Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,610 (Dec. 28, 2004).
36. Interagency Guidance Establishing Information Security Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,610,
77,611.
37. Id. at 77,610.
38. Id.
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2. B2C-Retail
Unlike financial institutions, B2C entities do not in general fall under a
broad statutory scheme that imposes data-handling responsibilities. Health-
care providers and facilities must follow specialized federal guidelines39
regarding personal medical information. Moreover, certain companies are
obliged to comply with guidelines set through industry self-regulation,
which, thus far, have largely proved to have "more public relations bark than
actual bite. 4°
The FTC has acted in this regulatory vacuum on nine occasions since
2002. Its basic theory is that a merchant's failure to take reasonable meas-
ures to protect customer data is an unfair practice in violation of the Federal
41Trade Commission Act of 1914 (FTC Act). In a typical data security com-
plaint, the FTC argues that the firm's data-handling practices constituted
unfair acts or practices in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.4 13 In settling its enforcement actions, the FTC has required both
39. Sectoral regulations exist for healthcare facilities and health insurers and other medical
entities, which are subject to information privacy and data security regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). HIPAA Regulations, 45
C.F.R. pts 160-64 (2006). In summary, federal regulations explicitly require financial institutions
and HIPAA "covered entities" to have reasonable data security, but all other companies operate
outside these requirements.
40. Eric Dash, Credit Card Rivals to Unite in Data Protection Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2006, at C3.
41. In chronological order, these enforcement actions were (1) Eli Lilly & Co., see News
Release, FTC, Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges Concerning Security Breach (Jan. 18, 2002), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/0l/elililly.htm; (2) Microsoft Corp., see News Release, FTC, Micro-
soft Settles FTC Charges Alleging False Security and Privacy Promises (Aug. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/08/Microsoft.htm; (3) Guess, Inc., see News Release, FTC, Guess
Settles FTC Security Charges; Third FTC Case Targets False Claims about Information Security
(June 18, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/06/guess.htm; (4) Petco, see News Re-
lease, FTC, Petco Settles FTC Charges (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2004/l l/petco.htm; (5) Superior Mortgage Corp., see News Release, FTC, Mortgage Company
Settles Information Security Charges (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2005/09/superior.htm [hereinafter Superior Mortgage News Release]; (6) BJ's Wholesale Club, see
News Release, FTC, BJ's Wholesale Club Settles FTC Charges (June 16, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/bjswholesale.htm [hereinafter BJ's News Release]; (7) DSW Shoe
Warehouse, see News Release, FTC, DSW Inc. Settles FTC Charges (December 1, 2005), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/12/dsw.htm; (8) ChoicePoint, see ChoicePoint News Release, supra
note 17; (9) CardSystems, see Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re CardSystems Solutions,
Inc, and Solidus Networks, Inc., File No. 052 3148 (ET.C. Feb. 23, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523148/0523148consent.pdf.
42. Complaint of FTC at 3, BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., File No. 042 3160 (June 26, 2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/050616comp0423160.pdf; Complaint of FTC at
3, DSW Inc., File No. 052-3096 (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0523096/051201comp0523096.pdf [hereinafter FTC-DSWI; Complaint of FTC at 8, United States
v. ChoicePoint, File No. 052-3069, Civil Action No. 06-CV-0198 (Jan. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf [hereinafter FTC-ChoicePoint].
43. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000). Thus, as one FTC Complaint stated, the "failure to employ
reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect personal information and files caused ...
substantial injury to consumers that is not offset by countervailing benefits to consumers or competi-
tion and is not reasonably avoidable by consumers." FTC-DSW, supra note 42, at 3.
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general and specific pledges of reasonable data security." There is more
than a fair amount of leeway for entities in deciding what data security
measures to take.
3. Outsourcing Entities
There is no explicit data security regulation for firms that carry out
back-office and other administrative operations involving personal informa-
tion. But statutory and other regulations applicable to the original data
processing entity generally apply to outsourcing entities as well . In addi-
tion, the GLB Act data security regulations explicitly oblige financial
institutions to "require [their] service providers by contract to implement
appropriate measures designed to protect against unauthorized access to or
use of customer information that could result in substantial harm or incon-
venience to any customer."4 Note that this broad language ("appropriate
measures") creates a standard. Moreover, the reliance on the contract drafted
by the original data collector is a further example of a delegation from the
government to a private party.
Self-regulatory efforts by financial institutions also extend to outsourc-
ing companies. As an example, six of the largest financial institutions in the
United States have developed joint requirements for the telecommunications
companies and data-service hosting companies that they use.41 These indus-
try requirements, through the Financial Institution Shared Assessments
Program, establish standards for security as well as a standard process for
assessing security levels. Yet, as has been the case for B2C retailers, self-
regulatory restrictions over outsourcing entities have fallen short.
4. Data Brokers
In the past, the regulatory hand fell lightly, if at all, on the information-
handling practices of data brokers. 49 Data brokers are in the business of col-
44. See BJ's News Release, supra note 41; ChoicePoint News Release, supra note 17.
45. A firm that processes personal data for a healthcare facility regulated by HIPAA is re-
quired to follow the HIPAA regulations. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.104, 164.105 (2005).
46. E.g., 12 C.F.R pt. 30, app. B.
47. BITS Financial Services Roundtable, Financial Institution Shared Assessments Program,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bitsinfo.org/FISAP/Forms/18SharedAssessmentsFAQ.pdf
(last visited Oct. 5, 2006).
48. Id.
49. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) applies to at least some transactions of data bro-
kers, namely, those that concern a "consumer report," as the FCRA defines this term. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 a(d) (2000). But data brokers sell other kinds of information and engage in activities that they
view as falling outside the FCRA's jurisdiction. Letter from Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. (EPIC) to the
FTC, Request for investigation into data broker products for compliance with the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/
fcraltrl2.16.04.html. Regardless of the extent to which the FCRA does or does not apply to the
database industry, however, the FCRA itself lacks any data security requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o
(2000).
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lecting personal information, maintaining it in databases, and extracting
value from it by comparing and combining it with other information and
then reselling it.5 ° They gather information from a variety of sources, includ-
ing public records and companies that do have direct B2C relations.' This
gap represented an especially large regulatory vacuum, one in which the
FTC took decisive action through an enforcement action against Choice-
Point. Its successful settlement of this action in January 2006 effectively
imposes a standard of reasonable security on data brokers. 2
In settling these charges, ChoicePoint did more than agree to pay $10
million in civil penalties and $5 million into a consumer redress fund. It
promised changes to its business and improvements to its security practices.
These changes took a shape that will be familiar by now: a mixture of stan-
dards and rules. In its settlement with the FTC, ChoicePoint agreed to
"establish and implement, and thereafter maintain, a comprehensive infor-
mation security program that is reasonably designed to protect the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected from or about
consumers." 53 Here, too, a delegation of authority through a standard was
supplemented by a handful of rules that provided a greater degree of speci-
ficity. Thus, in maintaining this "comprehensive information security
program," ChoicePoint promised to engage in risk assessments and to de-
sign and implement regular testing of the effectiveness of its security
program's key controls, systems, and procedures. It also agreed to obtain an
initial and then biennial outside assessment of its data security safeguards
from an independent third-party professional 4
5. Tort Law, Sarbanes-Oxley, and State and City
Breach Notification Laws
The final elements in the emerging framework of data security regula-
tions are tort law, the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley amendments to
federal securities laws, and state breach notification statutes. In tort law,
under a general negligence theory, litigants might sue a company after a data
security incident and seek to collect damages.55 Too few cases have occurred
to provide any strong basis for predictions about the future of tort actions for
56data security breaches . Claimants will likely have trouble convincing
50. For two recent accounts of these entities, see ROBERT O'HARROW, JR., No PLACE TO
HIDE 145-52 (2005); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 19-21 (2004).
51. O'HARROW, supra note 50, at 51.
52. In its complaint against ChoicePoint, the FrC based its action on the FCRA as well as its
statutory authority under the IFTC Act. FTC-ChoicePoint, supra note 42, at 1.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id. at 19.
55. See Johnson, supra note 19, at 296-310.
56. For cases rejecting tort liability following a data breach, see Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No.
4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72477 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006); Giordano v. Wachovia
Securities LLC, Civil No. 06-476 (JBS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52266 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006); Guin
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courts that the data processing entities owe a duty to the identity theft vic-
tims. Thus, a South Carolina court declared in 2003 that "[t]he relationship,
if any, between credit card issuers and potential victims of identity theft is
far too attenuated to rise to the level of a duty between them. 57 This conclu-
sion ignores the reality, however, that the credit card issuer's customer is a
foreseeable victim.
Regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, its Section 404 requires the CEO
and CFO of a public company to sign off on the company's financial state-
ments. In particular, those officers are required to certify that the company
has "adequate internal controls" on corporate data. While the focus of the
certification is on the accuracy of financial reporting, one requirement is that
these officers certify that these internal controls "[p]rovide reasonable as-
surance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized
acquisition, use or disposition of the issuer's assets that could have a mate-
rial effect on the financial statements.""s This single requirement has led
software firms to generate products for auditing data security practices, and
accounting firms and the various accounting standards boards to develop
standards for data security.5 9
Finally, as noted in this Article's Introduction, thirty-three states and one
city have enacted notification legislation within a few short years.6 We have
listed these statutes in this Article's Appendix and have analyzed each ac-
cording to the following criteria: (1) the entities that the law covers; (2) the
law's trigger for notification; (3) any exceptions to the law's notification
requirement; (4) the party to whom disclosure is required under the law; (5)
whether there is a substantive requirement for data security; and (6) the
presence or absence of a private right of action. This chart reveals the strong
influence of the California breach notification statute. It also provides an
overview of trends in the law of breach notification. To summarize our find-
ings, the chart indicates that twenty-three states follow the California
approach and rely on the acquisition standard for breach notification. Only
seven states have adopted a higher standard. New York City has its own
idiosyncratic standard and requires "unauthorized possession" of personal
v. Brazos Higher Education Service Corp., Civ. No. 05-668 (RHK/JSM), 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS
4846 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006); Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. Civ. 03-0185-PHX-
SRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41054, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 8, 2005); Smith v. Citibank, N.A., No.
00-0587-CV-W-I-ECF, 2001 WL 34079057, at *2-4 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2001), Polzer v. TRW, Inc.,
628 N.YS.2d 194, 195 (N.Y App. Div. 1998). In a case involving economic losses following from
an identity theft, a California court did award restitutionary damages to a victim, People v. Ware, No.
H025167, 2003 WL 22120898, at *2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2003). For a case awarding damages
following a data breach, see Bell v. Michigan Council 25 AFSCME, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 353, at
*1-2 (Feb. 15, 2005) (finding under "the unique circumstances of this case," a union owed plaintiffs,
its members, a duty due to the presence of a special relationship).
57. Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 S.E.2d 275, 277 (S.C. 2003).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2006).
59. See, e.g., Bruce I. Winters, Choose the Right Tools for Internal Control Reporting, J.
Accr., Feb. 2004, at 34, available at http://www.aicpa.orglpubs/jofalfeb2004/winters.htm.
60. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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• • 61information. A mere three states provide a private right of action for indi-
viduals whose information has been breached. Finally, only eight of the
state statutes create a substantive duty to take reasonable steps to safeguard
data.
We wish to say a few more words about these emerging state require-
ments for reasonable data security. While public and press attention has
largely been devoted to these statutes' requirements for informing consum-
ers of data leaks involving their personal information, a few of these laws
also explicitly require reasonable data security. Breach notification statutes
in Arkansas, California, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, and
• 62
Utah establish such a requirement. These seven state statutes prove to be
the most standard-like of all the regulations for data security; they provide
open-ended, general standards, such as a requirement to provide "reasonable
security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the informa-
tion. 63 In California, such standards are supplemented by nonbinding, albeit
more rule-like, recommendations from the Office of Privacy Protection.
64
B. Regulatory, Economic, and Reputational Pressures on the Firm
The "black-box" paradigm assumes, as Timothy Malloy has summa-
rized, that an "organization is a monolithic entity that essentially makes
decisions as a natural individual would.' 65 In rejecting the black-box con-
cept, this Article views the firm as acting through choices made by the
different individuals and different groups who work there. Indeed, within
many firms that process personal information, there is an important set of
individuals: chief privacy officers (CPOs), chief security officers, chief in-
formation officers, all of whom are responsible for a wide range of policy
issues regarding data security. There is no standardized job description of
where the lines between these different jobs begin and end, and no standard-
ized pattern of corporate adoption of all, some, or none of these different
officers. For purposes of simplification, therefore, this Article will refer to
these employees with responsibilities for policy issues regarding data secu-
rity as CPOs.
61. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-117 (2005). Any impact of the New York City law
vanished, however, because the New York State law on breach notification has preempted the City
law. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 899-aa(9) (McKinney 2005) ("No locality shall impose requirements
that are inconsistent with or more restrictive than those set forth in this section.").
62. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104 (2006); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West Supp. 2006);
Act of June 17, 2005, ch. 485, 2005 Nev. Stat. 2496; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-64 (2005); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-49.2-2 (2006); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.102 (2005); Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, 2006 Utah Laws 343 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-42-201) (effective January 1,
2007).
63. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West Supp. 2006).
64. CAL. DEP'T OF CONSUMER AFF., OFF. OF PRIVACY PROT., RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ON
NOTICE OF SECURITY BREACH INVOLVING PERSONAL INFORMATION 8 (2006) [hereinafter CALIFOR-
NIA PRIVACY OFFICE, RECOMMENDATIONS].
65. Malloy, supra note 29, at 532-33.
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The legal benchmark of reasonable data security can lead to ongoing in-
teractions between regulators, different kinds of industry organizations, and
CPOs in identifying and implementing processes and practices. But how
will companies decide on the kinds of practices that, taken together, consti-
tute reasonable data security? How will companies create policies for
notification of consumers after data breaches? This Article separates
pressures on firm decision-making into three distinct categories: regulatory,
economic, and reputational. 66 In evaluating a regime for data security and
breach notification, one should view the collective effect of these three
forces within a given firm as forming its overall culture of compliance.
1. Regulatory Forces
In making decisions about data security and breach notification, compa-
nies are obliged to respond to applicable law and regulations. The law
mandates the kinds of behavior that it wishes, and the firm is required to
follow its orders. For example, breach notification law requires a company
that discovers a security incident involving personal data to give notice to
affected parties. Yet one cannot simply assume that the law precisely com-
mands and companies perfectly obey.
Some firms have already demonstrated that they will disregard their le-
gal obligations to disclose material information. One need look no further
61than the Enron affair for proof of this point. Or consider Superior Mort-
gage, a lender with branch offices in ten states and multiple web sites. In
2005, Superior Mortgage became the subject of an FTC enforcement ac-
tion.68 As a financial institution, Superior Mortgage is subject to the
jurisdiction of the GLB Act. Yet this company neglected its obligations,
large and small, under these regulations. Its failures included the absence of:
(1) any formal assessment of risks to customer information, (2) appropriate
password policies to protect company systems and sensitive documents, and
(3) an appropriate response program.69 The law of data security does not,
however, rely on simple commands. Rather, it delegates considerable deci-
sion-making authority to the regulated entities. If the regulated entities are
inclined to resist their obligations, delegated discretion is a troubling choice.
Two further points can be made about the resulting flexibility in the
emerging legal commands for data security. First, the precise pattern of
standards and rules for data security proves highly context-specific. As an
example of a rule, a firm might be required to have one or more specific
66. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVI-
RONMENT 95-134 (2003); see also Neil A. Gunningham et al., Motivating Management: Corporate
Compliance in Environmental Protection, 27 LAW & POL'Y 288 (2005) [hereinafter Gunningham et
al., Motivating Management]; Neil Gunningham & Robert A. Kagan, Regulation and Business Be-
havior, 27 LAw & POL'Y 213 (2005).
67. Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Business Ethics, and Enron, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 63 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
68. Superior Mortgage News Release, supra note 41.
69. Id.
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employees coordinate the firm's data security program, or to utilize certain
kinds of password policies.70 As an example of a standard, FTC enforcement
actions require that firms identify "reasonably foreseeable internal and ex-
ternal risks to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer
information.'
Second, data security regulations raise normative issues because they
exemplify the phenomenon of delegated regulation. For example, Ian Ayres
and John Braithwaite propose a need for "enforced self-regulation" in which
the state retains the power of public enforcement (specifically, detection and
punishment).72 More recently, and in a similar vein, Michael Dorf proposed
a "rolling regulatory regime" in which regulators draw on information from
regulated entities and local experimentalism." Dorf envisions a process in
which "performance standards are continually ratcheted up as local experi-
mentation reveals what is possible. 74 We return to these proposals below;
important here is simply the idea that any delegation of data security regula-
tion raises important normative questions.
2. Economic Forces
Firms seek to maximize profits and are always under economic pres-
sures to do so. Indeed, according to Ronald Coase's seminal analysis, even
the boundaries of a company are set in response to these pressures.75 In his
famous rhetorical question, he asks: "[w]ill it pay to bring an extra exchange
transaction under the organizing authority?, 76 Firms will grow in size to take
on new tasks that are profitable for them, or else simply make contracts with
others. As for data security, one can generally expect companies to invest in
it from the perspective of wealth-maximizing entities. In other words, firms
will seek to calibrate security expenditures according to the level of legal
liability and the financial risks that they bear from leaked information. Data
security law also acknowledges, at least as a general matter, the legitimacy
of economic constraints. It only requires data safeguards that are reason-
able-not ones that are perfect, flawless, or otherwise airtight.
70. Regulations sometimes create a web of demands on certain companies-this observation
is particularly true for financial institutions and the handful of companies with which the FTC has
settled its enforcement actions. These rules contain both procedural and substantive requirements.
Interagency Guidance Establishing Information Security Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,610, 77,620 to
77,621. (Dec. 28, 2004).
71. Complaint of FTC at 2, Superior Mortgage Corp., File No. 052-3136 (Dec. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523136/051216comp0523136.pdf.
72. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 101-20 (1992).
73. Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 384, 398-400
(2003).
74. Id. at 399; see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 318-23 (1998).
75. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33-55 (1988).
76. Id. at 55.
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Yet, any assumption that firms act perfectly according to economic self-
interest would be simplistic. As an initial general example, firms do pass up
a host of profitable and cost-reducing projects on a regular basis." More
specifically for data security, companies may fail to (1) fully bear the costs
of data breaches or (2) precisely calibrate costs and benefits in deciding
their investments in data security.
As to the first point, many entities are not held responsible for the full
cost of data breaches, which creates two related externalities. We term these
the data security externality and the disclosure disincentive. The data secu-
rity externality reflects the fact that a data security breach at one company
may cause harm at another company in a way that is untraceable or for
781which there is no legal recourse. Stolen data are likely to lack any prove-
nance, that is, any information about their place of origin. Thus, if we
assume the breached entity's silence, any member of the public will be
unlikely to be able to identify the place from which data were stolen. As a
consequence, consumers may not associate the harm that they suffer with
the institution that leaked that data. The institution may also escape financial
liability to other financial institutions, because the law generally assigns the
financial risks for certain data breaches to the entity that mistakenly relied
on the fraudulently-presented information-that is, issued a new credit card,
granted a loan, or credited an electronic transfer-rather than the entity at
which the breach took place.79
The "disclosure disincentive" follows from the nondisclosure external-
ity. Disclosure may increase the risk of liability, because it makes traceable
an otherwise untraceable security breach. Furthermore, disclosure also
brings publicity to an event and might thereby prompt costly legal action or
regulatory scrutiny.
As to the point regarding the calibration of data security levels, evidence
from other fields shows how firms can be less than cool calculators of eco-
nomic investment in compliance. As an example, a large-scale empirical
study of corporate environmental behavior by Dorothy Thornton, Neil A.
Gunningham, and Robert A. Kagan found that persons responsible for com-
pliance at more than 200 studied facilities were ignorant of the specific
penalties their employers faced.8 ° At best, corporate compliance officials
tend to rely on rough estimates and rules of thumb.
77. Malloy, supra note 29, at 586-92.
78. For a discussion of how harms occur at locations other than the breached entity, see ID
ANALYTICS, supra note 26, at 14-18; Tom Zeller Jr., Black Market In Credit Cards Thrives on Web,
N.Y TIMES, June 21, 2005, at Al.
79. Section 133 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1) (2000), limits the liabil-
ity of a cardholder to $50 for unauthorized charges. For debit cards, the result is similar under the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a) (2000).
80. Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior, 27
LAW & POL'Y 262, 271-72 (2005).
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3. Reputational Forces
The third and final pressure on organizational behavior comes through
reputational forces and the related concerns of individuals at a company
about reputational capital. A host of scholars have demonstrated that indi-
viduals, businesses, and other organizations can be profoundly affected by
the circulation of information about their prior behavior. In separate works,
David Charny and Eric Posner discuss this point from the perspective of
norm theory. In Charny's pathbreaking work, for example, sanctions to
reputations play an important role in enforcing commitments by a wide
range of market participants.8 ' More recently, Eric Posner proposes that re-
putational information plays a key role more generally in structuring a wide
variety of cooperative endeavors."
Companies sometimes invest in data security because they care about
the regard in which they are held by outsiders, whether consumers, citizens,
communities, or social activists.83 The related literature on information pri-
vacy, for example, reveals how some decision-makers are highly sensitive to
the risks of a privacy meltdown that would tarnish their company's reputa-
tion with the public. A privacy meltdown is the revelation of a firm-wide
collection, storage, use, or transfer of personal information that shocks the
public and turns it against the company. For example, Laura Gurak shows
how reputational concerns played a role in the retreat by Lotus in 1990 from
its planned introduction of a database called "MarketPlace: Households."
84
The database was to contain sensitive information about millions of indi-
viduals. 8' A well-orchestrated public protest in cyberspace led
approximately thirty thousand people to contact Lotus and request that their
86
names be removed from the database. Lotus ultimately abandoned the
product; Gurak concludes that the company was concerned not only about
its "profit margins," but also "consumer attitudes" towards it.87 At that time,
consumers were likely disturbed by the prying into their lives represented by
the compilation and release of this personal information for direct market-
ing. Today, fear of unauthorized access to such information and the
possibility of identity theft would add another level of concern.
Thus, decision-makers at companies frequently care about the reputa-
tional capital of their firms and seek both to avoid social sanctions against
81. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373,
393-94 (1990).
82. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-25 (2000).
83. See BEN SMITH & BRIAN KOMAR, MICROSOFT WINDOWS SECURITY RESOURCE KIT 4
(2003) (noting that the loss of an "asset" through a security incident includes the cost of the "loss of
public trust or confidence").
84. LAURA J. GURAK, PERSUASION AND PRIVACY IN CYBERSPACE 19-31 (1997).
85. Id. at 19-20. The database included names, addresses, and detailed information on the
spending habits of 120 million Americans. Id. at 19, 21-22.
86. Id. at 29.
87. Id. at 43.
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them and to gain social approval. But concerns about reputation do not exist
only at the organization level. Reputational concerns also operate at the level
of individuals within the firm. In the United States, in notable contrast to
Canada and Germany,8 information privacy law has not generally required89
the creation of enterprise-wide CPOs. Nonetheless, a wide variety of com-
panies in the United States have created such positions within their ranks.90
Moreover, data security law recently has started to require companies to
designate specific employees as responsible for their data-handling practices
and breach-response programs. 9' A trend has been to fold at least some of
these data security obligations into existing offices of the CPO.
In a more immediate way than anyone else in a firm, the CPO has her
professional reputation on the line for issues regarding both information
privacy practices and data security leaks. This direct link should lead this
corporate officer to focus on the effectiveness of data security systems.
Moreover, when a firm creates these officers, it brings a higher profile
within the organization to the underlying task of providing data security.
Where the stakes are high enough, however, reliance on CPOs, industry self-
regulation, and cooperation or confession by the corporation may not pro-
vide an adequate solution to the data security problem.92
Reputation is not everything, and concerns about reputation do not have
a uniform impact on different individuals or firms. For one thing. larger and
more established firms, like Lotus in 1990, are likely to place a higher value
on their reputation than smaller, newer companies.93 In addition, CPOs may
be more concerned with quotidian pressures from within a firm than with
their reputation among their peers or regulators. Moreover, the sharing of
reputational information about a firm, even a classic "bad apple," may not
lead to effective public sanctions against it. And to the extent that the bad
88. See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act., 2000 S.C., ch. 5
(Can.); Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG, Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 1, 2003, RGBI. I at
§ 4f (ER.G.). Regulations in Japan require only that financial institutions appoint a CPO. Wugmeis-
ter et al., supra note 8.
89. The two exceptions are regulations issued under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act has
safeguard provisions for financial institutions over which the Federal Trade Commission (FT1C) has
jurisdiction. These institutions must "[diesignate an employee or employees to coordinate [its] in-
formation security program." 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(a) (2002). HIPAA requires "covered entities," which
are predominately health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers, to designate an
individual as a "privacy official," who will be responsible for the implementation and development
of the entity's privacy policies and procedures. 45 C.F.R § 164.530 (a)(1)(i).
90. See COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY 203 (2003)
("[Diata protection officers are rapidly becoming ubiquitous in private sector organizations' mana-
gerial structures .... ).
91. Interagency Guidance Establishing Information Security Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,610,
77,621. (Dec. 28, 2004).
92. Alexander Pfaff and Chris Sanchirico have carefully documented grounds for similar
concern in the context of self-auditing by companies pursuant to the Environmental Protection
Agency's audit policy. Alexander Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Big Field, Small Potatoes: An
Empirical Assessment of EPA's Self-Audit Policy, 23 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 415 (2004).
93. See Gunningham et al., Motivating Management, supra note 66, at 313.
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apple learns that such sanctions will not occur, it may invest less in its repu-
tation.94
Our previous comments about social sanctions have centered on the ex-
tent to which this force may have too little impact. Yet, there is another
aspect to the influence of social sanctions on the reporting of data security
breaches: fear of reputational harms may also have too great an impact. If a
firm controls whether disclosure will occur, it has the ability not to share
relevant information with the marketplace. No one likes to admit a mistake,
and a company that suffers a data security breach may be hesitant to dis-
close information about this event. We have already traced economic
reasons for this phenomenon, which we call the disclosure disincentive. In
contrast, this Article will now consider three distinct concerns that drive this
disincentive in the context of reputation.
First, other businesses may fear loss of customers and other opportuni-
ties if a breach is publicized and the responsible institution's reputation is
harmed. As Beth Givens of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse has predicted,
an institution is likely to suffer a "negative backlash" following notification
to customers that their data have been hacked.9 Customers may vote with
their feet (not to mention their checkbooks, ATM cards, and credit cards)
and end their relationship with the entity.96
Second, due to leaked information's lack of provenance, a business
might never be blamed for the leak for which it is responsible, and therefore
might never bear a reputational cost from it. Third, and as a related matter,
many organizations lack a B2C relationship with the persons whose data
they lose or allow to be leaked. Some outsourcing entities and data brokers
do not merely lack a direct relationship with the consumers whose data they
handle; the consumers may not even know they exist. For these organiza-
tions, the disclosure disincentive is especially strong. In the absence of
information about a data leak, these businesses would be able to continue
operations with scant scrutiny.
In summary, reputational sanctions are likely to influence firm behavior
in providing data security. But these influences can be quite complex. Bad
apple companies will not be sensitive to social sanctions, and a wide range
of other entities may prove resistant to social pressure, especially if sanc-
tions are not fully imposed in any "reputational market. 97 Finally,
reputational sanctions rely to a large extent on self-reporting of data security
failures. This reliance in turn may create a disincentive for reporting.
94. Posner and Chamy, for example, come to similar, mixed conclusions about the circula-
tion of reputational information. Posner is agnostic about whether the circulation of reputational
information will lead to more social cooperation. See POSNER, supra note 82, at 20-24. Chamy
generalizes that "some markets are better suited than others to enforce commitments by reputational
sanctions." Chamy, supra note 81, at 418.
95. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, California Security Breach Notification Law Goes into
Effect July 1, 2003, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/SecurityBreach.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
96. PONEMON INST., supra note 18, at 2.
97. On the difficulty of regulating "bad apples:' see Thornton et al., supra note 80, at 275-
March 2007]
Michigan Law Review
In this Section, we have opened up the black box of firm behavior and
discussed different factors that shape a given company's culture of compli-
ance. Understanding these factors is important because of the lack of
agreement as to the best legal model for informing the public about data
security breaches.
II. THREE MODELS Of INFORMING ABOUT
DATA SECURITY LEAKS
In this Part, we discuss three approaches to informing about data secu-
rity leaks. The first two are based on existing legal standards: our first model
("Model One") is exemplified by the pathbreaking California disclosure
statute, and our second model ("Model Two") reflects the Interagency Guid-
ance promulgated by the federal agencies responsible for oversight of
financial institutions. The final model is suggested by certain comments of
the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank (Chicago FRB) in response to the Inter-
agency Guidance.
This Article elaborates, modifies, and operationalizes these regulatory
approaches. This Part examines each model along six dimensions. We look
at the extent to which each respective regulation: (1) provides for sharing of
reputational information about the breached entity; (2) delegates discretion
to the regulated data processor, including how it should establish appropriate
data security and notify consumers of breaches; (3) coordinates post-breach
mitigation efforts; (4) permits delay to allow law enforcement investigation
before consumer notification; (5) provides for damages and other enforce-
ment rights; and, finally, (6) fosters an overall culture of compliance.
In all three models, disclosure of information is a central regulatory tool.
As Sunstein observed in 1999, "informational strategies are displacing (and
have significant advantages over) command-and-control approaches." 98 Sun-
stein also predicted that "informational regulation" would "become all the
more central in the coming decade, when there will likely be a great deal of
experimentation in this direction." 99 These three models demonstrate that
much experimentation is already taking place regarding sharing information
about data security breaches.
A. The Three Models in a Nutshell
The first model for regulating notice about security breaches centers on
mandatory, particularized notice to customers of the breached entity. By
particularized, we mean that the notification letter must identify the source
of the breach and the victim of the breach, to whom the letter will be ad-
98. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 617.
99. Id. at 618.
[Vol. 105:913
Notification of Data Security Breaches
dressed. Model One is exemplified by S.B. 1386, the California Security
Breach statute.' °° It is marked by a low threshold for notification. It also
lacks a coordination infrastructure to mitigate the harm flowing from a data
security incident. In this sense, it should be thought of as a pure notification
model.
Beyond the California statute and Model One, there is a second ap-
proach-our Model Two-that grants greater flexibility to businesses
regarding the reporting of breaches to customers, but that also offers a more
nuanced approach to data security practices within the firm and provides
opportunity for coordinated mitigation efforts. As an embodiment of Model
Two, we look to the consumer-notification provisions of a recently issued
regulation promulgated by four federal agencies with oversight authority
over financial institutions. These agencies issued the "Interagency Guidance
on Response Programs" pursuant to their authority under Section 501 of the
GLB Act.'0°
Rather than focusing solely on notice and reputational information, the
Interagency Guidance imposes requirements on financial institutions that
specify the manner in which they are to organize themselves to handle data.
For example, each must designate an officer who will be accountable within
the company for data security practices.0 2 The Interagency Guidance also
requires financial institutions to conduct risk assessments, implement rea-
sonable data security procedures, and have incident-response programs in
place to handle any security breaches.'0 3 With regard to notice, Model Two
adopts a two-tier approach that contemplates distinct types of notice and
notice thresholds. The first tier of notice concerns the financial institution's
oversight agency, and, like the California statute, uses the relatively low
threshold of "unauthorized access." The second tier of notice involves noti-
fication of the affected customers and requires action only after the
relatively higher threshold of a "likelihood of misuse" is met.
Published comments by the Chicago FRB provide the inspiration for this
Article's Model Three. The Chicago FRB offered its observations in re-
sponse to publication of an early draft of the Interagency Guidance. '°4 In its
100. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1798.28, .82, .84 (West Supp. 2006).
101. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736 (Mar. 29, 2005); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
§ 501(b), 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2000). While the California disclosure statute has a broad jurisdic-
tional sweep and applies to any private business, CAL. Civ. CODE § 1798.82 (West Supp. 2006), the
Interagency Guidance affects only "financial institutions" as defined by the GLB Act. Pursuant to
the Federal Trade Commission's Privacy Rule, a financial institution is "any institution the business
of which is engaging in financial activities as described in section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956." 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(k)(1) (2006) (citation omitted).
102. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,751 (Mar. 29, 2005).
103. Id.
104. Letter from Michael H. Moskow, President of the Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, to
Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.chicagofed.org/bankwide-public-policy/files/programs for-unauthorized_
access to customer information and notice.pdf (attaching response to Interagency Guidance).
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comment paper, the Chicago FRB suggests that a third-party intermediary
might be an appropriate entity with whom to share information about data
breaches in certain circumstances. This intermediary, "a trusted, neutral
third party," would forward information from the breached entity to other
financial institutions in cases of massive data breaches and also help finan-
• , 105
cial institutions coordinate the sharing of information with consumers.
The trusted neutral party would facilitate a coordinated response to the
security breach and also mitigate the disclosure disincentive. The Chicago
FRB notes the likely reluctance to become a first-mover in breaking bad
news to customers following an industry-wide data leak. It expresses this
concern in these terms: "no affected institution wants to be the first to notify
customers" subsequent to "a widespread compromise of customer informa-
tion. ' '° Moreover, industry competitors, such as Bank of America and
Citibank, may be reluctant to share information about a data leak with each
other. Ultimately, then, the Chicago FRB's trusted third party would step in
to assist the financial entities in coordinating a "proactive, unified notifica-
tion of affected customers."'' 7
As noted, the Chicago FRB was commenting on the Interagency Guid-
ance's two-track disclosure model. Its observations are limited, therefore,
solely to financial institutions. We build, in turn, on the Chicago FRB's own
proposal and posit a stand-alone "Anonymizing Disclosure Intermediary"
(ADI) as this Article's Model Three. The Chicago FRB makes a somewhat
delphic statement about financial institutions seeking to "leverage the abil-
ity" of a trusted, neutral third party "to facilitate anonymous information
sharing" among the organizations. '°s It is from this brief suggestion that we
elaborate a vision of a trusted third party, or ADI, which would notify con-
sumers and other financial institutions of security breaches without
revealing the identity of the breached party.
This third model highlights the fact that breach notification serves both
an ex ante and an ex post function. We use this model to distinguish the pro-
spective and retrospective functions of breach notices. Until now, this
Article has described the reputational sanction that a breach notice causes as
essentially forward-looking: it seeks to influence consumers to shop for data
security based on information about security incidents and to encourage
firms to safeguard their data to avoid reputational sanction. Mitigation looks
backward; it seeks to minimize the harm caused by breaches that have al-
ready occurred. The focus here should be on preventing future harm, and in
particular on generating coordinated responses to security breaches after
they have occurred. The proposed ADI would forward information about a
105. See id. ("[W]e suggest that financial institutions develop a means to coordinate customer
notification through a trusted, neutral third party such as the Financial and Banking Information
Infrastructure Committee (FBHC) or the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Cen-
ter (FS/ISAC).").
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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data breach to other financial institutions, and to affected consumers as well.
It would share this information, however, without identifying the locus of
the data breach. The open question is whether removing a reputational sanc-
tion through use of Model Three will significantly improve the law's ability
to mitigate harm. Through a consideration of this third model, we weigh the
benefits of reputational sanction against its costs in terms of harms to the
flow of information. Similarly, consideration of this model permits us to
focus on the other ways in which information about security breaches can
limit future harm.
B. Comparing the Models
In this Section, we compare the three models along several axes: (1) the
role of reputational information; (2) the location and supervision of deci-
sion-making authority; (3) the ability to coordinate efforts to mitigate harm;
(4) the extent to which law enforcement delays impair the scheme; (5) the
coordination of public and private remedial schemes; and (6) the extent to
which the respective Model helps to create an overall culture of compliance.
1. Reputational Information
The central goal of Model One is to impose a reputational sanction. An
initial difference between Model One and Model Two lies in their disclosure
trigger, and reflects this central focus on reputation and in particular on
sanctions. Under the California statute, disclosure follows upon a reasonable
belief of unauthorized access to the consumer's personal information. Under
the higher threshold of the Interagency Guidance, however, a business is to
decide whether or not misuse will occur.'0 9 As the Interagency Guidance
states: "[i]f the institution determines that misuse of its information about a
customer has occurred or is reasonably possible, it should notify the affected
customer as soon as possible."" As we shall see shortly, however, this re-
quirement does not stand alone. Model Two also contains a second
disclosure track for notification of regulators, which is similar to, and per-
haps even more stringent than, Model One's lower trigger. In contrast, under
the misuse trigger, there must be the likelihood of some other action by a
fraudster, such as an opening of fraudulent accounts, before consumer noti-
fication. Model Two distinguishes security breaches where a reputation
sanction is necessary from those where it is not.
More important, however, under Model One, notice is particularized. In
other words, the institution that suffers the breach is obliged to reveal its
identity to the consumer whose data was compromised and to acknowledge
that it is the source of the breach."' This approach imposes a reputational
109. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,752 (Mar. 29, 2005).
110. Id.
111. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West Supp. 2006).
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sanction on the business. The statute's insight is that disclosure causes a
useful embarrassment: to avoid notice and the accompanying reputational
loss, a business will invest ex ante in data security and, ex post, will respond
more effectively and vigorously to a breach due to increased public and
regulatory scrutiny of its practices.
The California statute's focus on the reputational sanction is highlighted
by its treatment of massive security breaches. Where notice to individuals is
impractical, the statute still imposes a reputational sanction through so-
called "substitute notice." " 2 Substitute notice is allowed if providing particu-
larized notice will cost more than $250,000, the affected class numbers
more than 500,000 persons, and the breached entity lacks sufficient contact
information."3 Businesses have three obligations when providing substitute
notice: (1) to give e-mail notice to customers where possible, (2) to post a
notice of the breach on their web sites, and (3) to notify major statewide
media. "4 These steps are calculated to insure a flood of publicity about any
company that suffers a major security leak, but accomplish little more. Sub-
stitute notice does not identify the victims of the breach. Customers are
unlikely to know that they are affected by this general news and are, there-
fore, unable to take steps to self-protect.
Similar to Model One, Model Two provides particularized notice to con-
sumers. Model One and Model Two share the view that disclosing
information about a data security failure will cause a useful embarrassment.
Both Model One and Model Two rely on reputational pressures, and both
must contend with the resulting disincentive to disclose a security breach.
Although both models rely on the disclosure of reputational information
through particularized notice, an initial difference between the approaches is
that Model Two's "misuse" threshold is likely to lead to fewer notification
letters and less use of reputational sanction."5 A second difference between
the two approaches concerns the potential positive role of a firm's CPO un-
der Model Two. Third, as noted above, the Interagency Guidance's two-
track system allows a CPO who discovers an unauthorized use of data to
report it to the relevant regulatory agency without fully confronting the issue
of customer notification. The stakes are lower for this report than for breach
notification to customers; for one thing, the oversight agency may decide,
along with the breached entity, that unauthorized use is not likely and that
consumer disclosure is unnecessary.
Models One and Two view the threat of consumer notification as central
to inducing investment in data security. In contrast, Model Three gives a free
ride to breached entities on this score: the ADI discloses the fact of the
breach without identifying the locus of the leak. Particularized notification
112. Id. § 1798.82(g)(3).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The Interagency Guidance sets a higher disclosure trigger for notice to consumers. Inter-
agency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and
Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,752 (Mar. 29, 2005).
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disseminates reputational information about the breached entity for ex ante
purposes. It seeks to encourage investment by the company in reasonable
data security practices and to permit consumers to choose companies based
on information about their history of data security breaches. Notification
about security breaches also serves ex post function of mitigation. It seeks to
permit consumers and other data processing institutions to protect them-
selves from harm caused by a data spill that has already occurred.
Model Three turns on the insight that the threat of reputational sanction
may serve to chill a company's willingness to inform about a security
breach. This inhibiting effect may limit the ability of customers, other insti-
tutions, and regulators to reduce the harm flowing from the breach. Models
One and Two grant considerable discretion to the information-processing
organization. Yet to the extent that these two models use a reputational sanc-
tion, firms have an incentive to exercise this discretion regarding breach
notification in a manner that may undercut the regulation's effectiveness.
Model Three's ADI seeks to overcome this problem by freeing the breached
entity from reputational harm.
There are important trade-offs when one chooses a notification regime
that favors mitigation over reputational sanction. The key question here is
the role of particularized notice. To what extent does the customer need to
know the source of the breach? If the purpose of the notice is to impose a
reputational sanction, then identifying the source of the breach is essential.
If, however, the goal is to allow the customer to take steps to safeguard her
data, knowing the location of the security breach is much less important.
Whether the lack of reputational information matters in any significant fash-
ion will turn on the availability of alternative means for encouraging firms to
comply with appropriate data security practices, and the ability of customers
to change their market behavior based on information about security prac-
tices.' 6 In short, if the focus of regulation is mitigation, then very little may
be lost by abandoning particularized notices, and much may be gained in
terms of a firm's willingness to disclose. By contrast, if the focus is on repu-
tational sanction, then identity is an indispensable element of the regulatory
scheme.
2. Delegation of Discretion
The California statute's notification trigger is a standard. Recall that it
turns on a breached entity's reasonable belief that there was unauthorized
acquisition of personal data. This approach grants considerable discretion to
the breached entity in its decision whether or not to notify the affected indi-
vidual. Furthermore, it is possible for information to be lost without an
unauthorized acquisition ever occurring. For example, in early December
2005, the international delivery company DHL lost a backup tape with
116. Customers do not currently shop for services based on a company's data security prac-
tices. See infra Section III.A. In addition, many of the steps that customers need to take after a
breach, such as requesting a credit report, do not require knowledge of where their data was leaked.
See infra Section Il.B.
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residential mortgage information that it was transporting for ABN-Amro
Mortgage group."' The lost tape contained detailed account information,
including SSNs, of approximately two million individuals.' 8 After a month,
DHL found the missing tape, to which no outside party had gained access.19
To be sure, any threshold for disclosure will provide at least some kind
of inherent delegation; in particular, the unauthorized acquisition test per-
mits leeway to the breached entity to decide how, when, and whether to
conclude that data have been acquired. This level of discretion is, nonethe-
less, lower than under the "misuse" trigger, which we discuss in the next
Section. The question under Model One is simply whether an unauthorized
person has acquired notice-triggering information, not whether this person
will go on to misuse it. Misuse requires the institution to conclude that fur-
ther activity, such as the opening of fraudulent accounts, is likely. Thus,
while the issue of acquisition may seem rule-like, it is, in fact, a standard.
One is reminded of Duncan Kennedy's observation that an apparent rule
may actually be "a covert standard."'"2
The reliance of the California statute on particularized notification has
the important benefit of bringing breaches to light. But the focus on reputa-
tion may also have the unintended consequence of heightening the
disclosure disincentive that this Article identified earlier. The disclosure dis-
incentive may cause breached entities to err on the side of nondisclosure,
and the net effect of the disincentive may hamper response to data leaks.
There are, however, similarities between Models One and Two. For one
thing, the language of the Interagency Guidance, like that of the California
statute, is primarily driven by standards and not rules. As an initial example,
the Interagency Guidance suggests that "[a]t a minimum, an institution's
response program should contain procedures for [aissessing the nature and
scope of an incident ... [and] taking appropriate steps to contain and con-
trol the incident to prevent further unauthorized access to or use of customer
117. Lucas Mearian, Update: Missing ABN Amro tape with 2 million names found, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Dec. 20, 2005, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=
viewArticleBasic&articleld=107230.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 1701. As we have observed, moreover, these and other rec-
ommendations of the California Office of Privacy Protection regarding breach notification are non-
mandatory. And even these non-binding guidelines have further wiggle room built in, as the Office
of Privacy Protection illustrates:
Information-handling practices and technology are changing rapidly, and organizations should
continuously review and update their own situation to ensure compliance with the laws and
principles of privacy protection. It is recognized that specific or unique considerations, includ-
ing compliance with other laws, may make some of these practices inappropriate for some
organizations.
CALIFORNIA PRIVACY OFFICE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64, at 8. This wiggle room may
become problematic because the statute necessarily relies on the breached entity to discover the
breach, and then to subject itself to a reputational sanction.
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information."'' 2' As for the primary standard in the Interagency Guidance, it
is the "misuse" trigger for notification. The relevant language delegates
broad discretion. Moreover, the standard sets a higher threshold for con-
sumer notification than the California statute does. The preamble to the
Interagency Guidance explains its tactic in these terms: "[T]he Agencies do
not want customers of financial institutions to receive notices that would not
be useful to them.' 22
This language regarding notices that are not "useful" alludes to two po-
tential problems. First, notification might "needlessly alarm customers
where little likelihood of harm exists."'' 23 Second, "frequent notices in non-
threatening situations would be perceived by customers as routine and
commonplace, and therefore reduce their effectiveness."' 24 The two concerns
are related-the approach of the regulators reflects a fear that too many no-
tices where harm does not follow are the modem equivalent of the shepherd
crying wolf.
As noted in the Introduction, Fred Cate, a critic of the California statute
and similar legislation, argues that consumers, dulled by frequent cautions
about harms that never materialize, will fail to act when important warnings
finally arrive. 25 More generally, Cass Sunstein, in his work regarding infor-
mation regulation, points to the danger of information overload. 26 Sunstein
concludes that "[w]ith respect to information, less may be more."'
27
Like Model One, however, Model Two's heightened threshold for dis-
closure might provide a loophole for organizations already reluctant to share
information about data breaches. Indeed, the discretion under Model Two's
"misuse" standard is, if anything, greater than under Model One's "acquisi-
tion" standard. A finding of misuse requires a determination beyond
acquisition, namely that the breached information will be used in fraudulent
activities. The raised threshold permits additional discretion to the breached
entity; this broader delegation, coupled with the existence of the disclosure
disincentive, might bias the business's investigation of a data leak and lead
to a facile conclusion that misuse of information was unlikely and consumer
notification was not required.
121. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,740 (Mar. 29, 2005). Even the lengthy,
nonbinding preamble to the Interagency Guidance discusses institution action in the language of
standards. See, e.g., id. at 15,741 ("[T]he Agencies contemplate that a financial institutional will
notify regulators as quickly as possible .... ); id. at 15,742 ("[Tihe Agencies believe that institu-
tions should be mindful of industry standards when investigating an incident.").
122. Id. at 15,743.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Cate, supra note 9.
126. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 626-29.
127. Id. at 627-28. ("[Clonsumers... treat a large amount of information as equivalent to no
information at all. Certainly this is true when disclosure campaigns are filled with details that cannot
be processed easily." (footnote omitted)).
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The Interagency Guidance provides an intriguing response to the notion
that businesses might exploit the misuse standard: it creates a further disclo-
sure obligation. The Interagency Guidance requires notification to a
breached institution's oversight agency. And it sets a low threshold for
sending this information to the agency, one similar to, and perhaps even
stricter than, the California statute's standard for consumer notification. Pur-
suant to this second track, a breached entity must notify "its primary Federal
regulator as soon as possible when the institution becomes aware of an inci-
dent involving unauthorized access to or use of [personal] information. 28
Note that this quoted language calls for a disclosure standard of mere "unau-
thorized access." This second track provides an "early warning," which is
"to allow an institution's regulator to assess the effectiveness of an institu-
tion's response plan, and, where appropriate, to direct that notice be given to
customers if the institution has not already done so.'
29
Through this two-track approach, the Interagency Guidance provides for
a government overseer to review the financial institution's decision whether
to disclose to individuals. It also gives the agency an opportunity to consider
steps other than notice to mitigate the harm caused by the breach. But the
Guidance provides no explanation as to when the agency should override the
institution's decision not to disclose, or what other steps the agency might
take. It also leaves open questions as to the form of any mandated notice.
Model Three's ADI seeks to use a carrot, rather than a stick, to over-
come the danger that firms will exercise discretion in a way that undercuts
the effectiveness of breach notification. By providing for anonymous disclo-
sure, Model Three allows a firm to limit the harm caused by a breach-and
hence any potential exposure-by notifying customers and other financial
institutions. The firm thereby obtains the benefits of disclosure without suf-
fering the costs.
3. Coordination of Post-Breach Mitigation Efforts
We have termed the California law a pure notification statute. This ob-
servation reflects both what the law does and what it does not do. The
statute's emphasis is on disclosure, as exemplified by its comparatively low
threshold for notification and also by the scant attention paid to coordination
of post-breach mitigation efforts. Its attention is to the moment of notifica-
tion, but not to what comes afterwards.
In its Sections 4 and 5, the California statute only requires that affected
consumers be notified. It does not require placing information on a fraud
list, notice to other institutions, or any other type of coordinated response. It
128. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,752 (Mar. 29, 2005).
129. Id. at 15,741.
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does not even require automatic notification of law enforcement officials.30
The statute permits notification of these officials, however, and we turn now
to this topic.
In contrast to Model One's pure notification approach, the Interagency
Guidance seeks to coordinate post-breach mitigation efforts. One way that it
does so is by a two-track system for notification. The creation of an inter-
mediate form of disclosure may limit the extent to which breached entities
can manipulate the "misuse" standard for consumer notification. While this
delegation is broader than Model One's pure notification standard, it does
not result in a complete lack of supervision.
Unde- this model, the oversight agency becomes aware of the breach at
the financial institution and may be able to scrutinize the institution's deci-
sion whether or not to disclose to customers. Moreover, the sharing of
information with an agency sets up a formal mechanism for an information
flow back to an external, independent third party-one able to generate in-
formation about past breaches and whether or not certain kinds of
acquisitions lead to misuse. As Doff states regarding his model of rolling
regulation, government entities can disseminate key information "about
what works and what does not ... back to the regulated entities so that they
may learn from each other's successes and failures.""'
As for Model Three, the Chicago FRB's comment reflects a hope that an
intermediary can provide a degree of coordinated response beyond mere
notification of customers. The focus of Model One is solely on giving notice
to customers. Such notice has many benefits, but it may actually do less to
protect against harm than if the breached entity were to inform an interme-
diary. The intermediary could, in turn, disclose to other financial institutions
and related entities, such as institutions involved in clearing charges on
credit and payment cards. The key difference is that, under Model Three,
information flows from the intermediary to other institutions and customers,
rather than from the breached entity to other institutions and customers.
The intermediary might serve as a clearinghouse for information about
usurped identities. If an organization were to disclose a breach to an ADI,
this entity also would receive information about the identity of the consum-
ers whose information was leaked.3 2 The ADI could then serve two
anonymizing functions. With regard to other financial institutions, the iden-
tity of the consumer could be shared in the form of a fraud watch list.133 The
other institutions would not be informed about the source of the breach.
130. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.82 (West Supp. 2006). Here, the statute encourages such
action by permitting a delay in notification of affected individuals when necessary to facilitate the
investigations of law enforcement officials.
131. Dorf, supra note 73, at 398-99.
132. A flaw in Model Three, however, is that this new entity, the ADI, might be the target of
hackers. For this reason, we advocate a policy of data minimalization in our Model Four's coordi-
nating response architecture. Infra Section W.A.
133. Such lists would raise privacy concerns, however, and concerns about additional data
security breaches. Later in this Article, we suggest a strategy of data minimalization in response to
such concerns. Infra Section IV.A.
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Similarly, customers would be notified that their information was compro-
mised; the consumers could then request credit reports and examine their
own account statements with added care.
4. Delay to Allow Investigation
One of the California statute's findings of fact concerns the importance
of "expeditious notification" to identity theft victims.1 14 The statute's judg-
ment on this score is bolstered by empirical findings that demonstrate the
benefits of rapid detection of identity theft. 35 The longer an instance of iden-
tity theft goes undetected, the greater the damage that usually follows.
36
Despite the value of rapid notification, the California law allows a delay
in reporting data leaks "if a law enforcement agency determines that the
notification will impede a criminal investigation." 137 The policy judgment
behind this aspect of the California statute considers two interests: (1) the
individual benefit from rapid disclosure of a data leak; and (2) the public
benefit from the arrest of criminals who hacked or otherwise obtained per-
sonal information. By permitting a law enforcement delay, the California
statute favors the general public interest in apprehending the criminal when
it conflicts with immediate notification, and, hence, protection for the indi-
viduals whose data were stolen. This choice is a sensible one.
Unfortunately, the law enforcement delay can allow a further opportu-
nity for business foot dragging regarding disclosure of information about a
data breach. As an example, a Los Angeles police task force accused Choic-
ePoint of delay in making the disclosure to the affected public once the
police cleared it to share information with consumers. 38 In short, while the
availability of the law enforcement delay may encourage breached entities
to notify law enforcement officials, this regulatory choice hardly constitutes
a coordinated effort to mitigate the harm caused by the data spill and may
even prove an obstacle to such coordinated response.139
According to the Interagency Guidance, which forms the basis for this
Article's Model Two, the breached institution is to file a "Suspicious Activ-
ity Report" (SAR) with "appropriate law enforcement authorities" pursuant
to existing federal regulations regarding financial fraud. 40 This requirement
of law enforcement notification is tied to the same kind of delay mechanism
134. 2002 Cal. Stat., ch. 915, § 1.
135. SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 8 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovaterepori.pdf.
136. Id.
137. CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1798.82(c) (West Supp. 2006). Notification proceeds only once the
law enforcement entity determines that disclosure "will not compromise the investigation." Id.
138. Tom Zeller Jr., Release of Consumers' Data Spurs ChoicePoint Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2005, at C2.
139. For a discussion of how other methods of responding to security breaches might mitigate
the harm caused by this delay, see Section IV.B of this Article.
140. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,752 (Mar. 29, 2005).
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as in the California statute. The applicable language in the Interagency
Guidance permits customer notification to be postponed "if an appropriate
law enforcement agency determines that notification will interfere with a
criminal investigation and provides the institution with a written request for
the delay."'4'' The risk, as under Model One, is that the delay for law en-
forcement activity may cause harm to the consumer whose personal
information has been leaked.
42
As for Model Three, ideally, this Model can eliminate, or, at least re-
duce, the extent to which any law enforcement delay is necessary after a
data leak. The ADI would generate anonymous notification messages that
inform consumers that a leak has taken place, but withhold information re-
garding the locus of this event. As a result, notification under Model Three
may be less likely to tip off a criminal hacker and compromise an ongoing
investigation. Model Three might, therefore, allow law enforcement investi-
gations to occur simultaneously with more information being shared with
other data processing organizations and affected consumers.
5. Damages and Other Enforcement Rights
The California statute provides a private right of action for violations of
its notification and reasonable data security provisions. 43 Violations of these
provisions can also be enjoined.'" Finally, the California law provides that
the "rights and remedies available" under it "are cumulative to each other
and to any other rights and remedies.' 45 In addition to California, other
states, such as Tennessee and Washington, provide private rights of action
for violation of their notification statutes.1
4
1
Concerning Model Two, the Interagency Guidance does not provide for
a private right of action. Power to enforce the Guidance itself is conferred
solely on the financial institutions' primary federal regulator. ' Thus, failure
to comply with the Interagency Guidance does not create liability to cus-
tomers.
As for Model Three, if a disclosure regime is focused on "anonymous"
disclosure, private rights of action are problematic. The victims of identity
theft may know that they are victims of a security breach, but they are
unlikely to know where the breach occurred. For data processing entities,
one of the attractions of the anonymous disclosure model would likely be
141. id. The financial institution is to inform consumers "as soon as notification will no
longer interfere with the investigation." Id.
142. See SYNOVATE, supra note 135, at 34.
143. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b) (West Supp. 2006).
144. Id. § 1798.84(e).
145. Id. § 1798.84(g).
146. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(h) (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.255.010(10)(a) (West Supp. 2006); Id. § 42.17.31922(10)(a) (West 1999).
147. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,753 (Mar. 29, 2005).
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the lack of individual enforcement. The lack of individual legal actions
would follow either because the third regime did not provide a private right
of action, or, as a practical matter, because the data leak victim did not know
where the breach occurred.
Yet if the intermediary shields the financial institution from liability, the
law must carefully craft an incentive for the breached entity to share infor-
mation with the ADI about data breaches. 4 ' Failure to disclose a breach to
the ADI might give rise to statutory damages, while if a breached entity dis-
closes to the ADI, it might have its damages capped at a particular level, or
shielded from class action liability. Conceptually, liability for failure to dis-
close to the ADI might be termed a failure to mitigate. As such, a failure to
disclose to the ADI might be made subject to full compensatory or statutory
damages, possible punitive damages, and attorney fee shifting.'
49
6. The Culture of Compliance
The California statute makes the kinds of delegations to private actors
that are frequently found in the modem regulatory landscape. Yet it suffers
from a number of shortcomings. As a delegated regulation, it falls short of
the kind of "rolling regulatory regime" that Doff proposes. In particular,
there is no structure in place for regulators to draw on information from
regulated entities about local experimentalism. Regulated entities will de-
velop their data security practices and, over time, refine the scope of the
"reasonable data security" obligation, but, under the current regime, the
regulators-and by extension the rest of the industry-have no means of
benefiting from this experience. There is also no mechanism for using new
information, based on this experience, to shape and give content to the noti-
fication triggers of "reasonable data security" or "unauthorized access."
Moreover, due to the disclosure disincentive, economic pressures may cause
breached entities to be hesitant to notify customers or even to investigate
breaches that may give rise to an obligation to give notice.
Model One also seeks to draw on reputational sanctions through its re-
quirement for particularized notice. Yet the effectiveness of such sanctions
depends on a well-functioning consumer-side market for data security. As
we discuss in this Article, there are shortcomings at present in the ability of
148. Payment law already contains a carefully calibrated allocation of risk for unauthorized
use of checks or credit cards. Generally, the risk of forged checks lies with the account holder's
bank. U.C.C § 4-401 (1999); id. cmt. I. For stolen checks with forged endorsements, risk of loss
falls on the first solvent party to trust the forger (usually the depositary bank). Id. §§ 4-207, 4-208.
For credit cards and debit cards, the Truth in Lending Act as well as the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act generally places the risk of unauthorized use, at least in the first instance, on the issuing bank.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1643(a), 1693g (2000).
149. One example of such an approach, in an analogous context, is the Fair Credit Reporting
Act. 15 U.S.C §§ 1681-1681u (2000). Where a credit bureau fails to comply with the requirements
of the Act, the agency is held liable for actual damages, and where the noncompliance is willful,
there is a statutory minimum of $100 per violation in damages. Id. § 1681n(a)(l)(A). In order to
encourage attorneys to take such cases, a victorious party may also be entitled to have their attor-
neys' fees paid. Id. §§ 1681n(c), 1681o(b).
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an individual to shop for services from information-processing companies
according to their data security practices."0
Like the California statute, the Interagency Guidance delegates authority
to private actors through use of a standard. Yet by requiring disclosure to
oversight agencies, regulators may be able to draw on information from
regulated entities and affect decision-making about "reasonable data secu-
rity" and the conditions under which "access" or "misuse" are likely to
occur. Economic pressures may also contribute to a breached entity's desire
not to disclose information about a breach. The Interagency Guidance also
sets up a different kind of information flow to the public; whereas informa-
tion about a breach is shared with a regulator once a low threshold is met,
this knowledge stays with the agency unless a higher threshold is reached.
This result is notable, and there is potential for a positive impact on the dis-
closure disincentive. We return to and develop this point further in Part IV.
Regarding reputational pressures, Models One and Two both require
particularized notice to the individual whose information is leaked. While
there may be resistance within the firm to providing this notice, due to the
disclosure disincentive, CPOs may also emerge as advocates for full investi-
gation and consumer notification. Model Two may strengthen the hand of
the CPO within the firm, moreover, by giving her a formal role to play in
providing notification to oversight agencies. The importance of a responsi-
ble corporate officer in fostering a culture of compliance has received a
surprising yet instructive demonstration through an unintentional aspect of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which we mentioned earlier in this Article. The
Act's requirement regarding adequate internal legal controls on corporate
data has led to the development of security standards and heightened inter-
nal corporate attention to issues regarding data security. 5 '
Model Three has a different mix of promise and peril than the other ap-
proaches. The ADI would interact with a firm once a breach took place, and
would itself take on the role of contacting the individual whose information
was lost. By removing any reputational harm from the breached entity, it
would presumably reduce the unwillingness of the firm to share information
about the security event-whether with the ADI or with the public. Re-
course to an ADI would remove any reputational sanction on the breached
institution, and might also improve the ability of the breached institution,
affected consumer, and other parties to mitigate the harms flowing from a
data leak. Indeed, the ADI as information intermediary might serve as a
clearinghouse for usurped identities and seek in other ways to coordinate
responses to data security breaches. Another positive impact of Model Three
would be to reduce the need for any law enforcement delay. A possible
weakness of Model Three, however, is that a lack of individual enforcement
rights and information about breaches might permit breached entities to skirt
any information sharing obligations towards the ADI.
150. See infra Section III.A.
151. See, e.g., Winters, supra note 59.
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III. DEFINING IDEAL BEHAVIOR FOR THE CONSUMER
AND THE DATA PROCESSOR
In the previous Part, this Article set out three models for consumer noti-
fication. These models differ in important ways. However, all three
approaches aim to influence the same two entities: the consumer whose in-
formation is processed, and the business entity that processes information.
Models Two and Three also consider a third set of entities-the other insti-
tutions that might be affected by a data leak. In this Part, we describe the
nature of the sought-after behavior by positing an ideal consumer and ideal
data processor. We also analyze the extent to which breach notification is
likely to induce this behavior.
A. The Ideal Consumer and Reputational Information:
Shopping for Data Security
Put simply, the ideal consumer is expected to shop for data security.
Moreover, this behavior is expected to occur both before and after a breach.
Here is the rosy scenario: if one firm has a bad reputation for data security,
the ideal consumer will shun it and patronize another company. Moreover,
should a data leak occur, the consumer will receive valuable reputational
information through the notification letter. The ideal consumer will again
take action by fleeing the offending company and rewarding a company
with a reputation for good security practices by switching-her business to
it.152
This story embodies various assumptions about consumer behavior upon
notification that we believe are inaccurate or, at least, excessively sanguine.
Under current market conditions and notification practices, consumer shop-
ping for data security will at best be erratic."' In our judgment, there are,
nonetheless, real merits to customer notification, but they are indirect and
generally not linked to the affected consumer. In this Section, we explore
why consumers have not drawn on the reputational information in breach
disclosure letters to apply direct sanctions to breached companies.
1. Lack of B2C Relationship
One set of difficulties with consumer shopping for data security follows
from the frequent lack of any B2C relationship between the individual
whose data are stolen and the entities that play a major role in processing
her information. As a result of the lack of a direct relationship, a consumer
cannot fire CardSystems, an outsourcing entity that processes payments;
UPS or DHL, outsourcing entities that transport data; Iron Mountain Stor-
152. The ideal consumer would also take a number of self-protective steps, but we reserve
discussion of this behavior for this Part's next Section. See infra Section mI1.1.
153. For an argument about the difficulties in shopping for information privacy under current
market conditions, see Paul M. Schwartz, Properr', Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REv.
2055, 2076-84 (2004).
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age, an outsourcing entity that stores data; or ChoicePoint, a data broker. It
is also unlikely that the consumer will be able to switch accounts success-
fully in order to avoid any indirect relationship with these entities.'
4
Financial institutions and other kinds of businesses do not advertise the ex-
tent to which they contract data processing functions to other entities.
2. Consumer-Side Shortcomings and Fuzzy Notification Letters
Even when a B2C relationship exists, as with a credit card company or a
bank, additional problems arise regarding the ability of consumers to shop
for data security. First, a consumer may face considerable switching costs
associated with changing his banking and credit relationships. While it is
easy enough to cancel a credit card, or apply for another one, it is much
more difficult to move one's bank accounts from one institution to another.
Consumers often have relatively entrenched relationships with a principal
bank. They may have depositary accounts, a mortgage, an investment ac-
count, uniform transfer to minors accounts, an online payment system, and
so on, all accumulated over a period of banking at a specific institution. One
letter about a security incident may not cause such an individual to sever
this banking relationship, even if it is feasible.
Second, a consumer generally has good information about price (such as
the cost of a checking account), but bad information about non-price terms
(such as the full range of investment by a company in data security and
whether such investment is likely to be effective). Even if somehow supplied
with complete information about how a company manages data security, the
average consumer-indeed, anyone who is not an information security pro-
fessional-would be hard pressed to make sense of it.'55
Notification letters are not likely to alter this situation. Notification let-
ters supply only incomplete, discontinuous, and non-comparative
information about data security. To use Eric Posner's terminology, a pooling
equilibrium exists around notification letters.'56 Under the circumstances of
a pooling equilibrium, good and bad types alike engage in the same behav-
ior and send the same signal.1 7 Breach notification obliges companies to
send a negative signal, but the resulting letters provide only a fuzzy signal
about future behavior and the likelihood of additional data security
breaches. These missives are required to inform a consumer that her per-
sonal data have been leaked, and the name of the breached entity (at least
under Models One and Two). This information provides neither background
as to how the company has fared in the past nor comparative data to permit
154. See generally Zeller, supra note 20 (noting that it is a common practice for businesses to
outsource data delivery to independent couriers such as UPS).
155. To make matters difficult, even for an IT professional, security updates and fixes are
required on a continuous basis, so evaluation of a company's practices must likewise be made on a
continuous basis. SMITH & KOMAR, supra note 83, at 12.
156. For a description of how signals can "pool:' see POSNER, supra note 82, at 19-20.
157. Id. at 19-21.
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evaluations across companies or industries. Moreover, the letters do not
point to any way to impose reputational costs on any third party that might
be involved in the breach.
To be sure, some companies now advertise their concern for data secu-
rity. Here, another kind of fuzzy, if not outright misleading, signal can be
sent. As a notable example, a journalist explained that Visa "already had a
response ready" for public concerns once it discovered its credit cards were
implicated in the CardSystems breach. 8 Visa responded with a media blitz:
"[i]t simply increased the frequency of existing spots, like those featuring
fraud-fighting superheroes and a fireman clad in layers of protective gear."5 9
To its credit, Visa also investigated and then severed its ties with CardSys-
tems-a fact that, perhaps paradoxically, it does not advertise.' 60 As a further
example of the limits of advertising, Citibank is touting its attention to iden-
tity theft in print and television advertisements. Yet, one of Citibank's major
subsidiaries, CitiFinancial, recently suffered a significant data breach . In
response, Citigroup "put back into rotation several ads for its identity theft
services."62
Upon notification, a Visa customer would be hard-pressed to decide
whether to switch to MasterCard, which also advertises about its data secu-
rity, and which was also implicated in the CardSystems breach. 63 A
Citibank customer would be in a similar quandary regarding whether better
data security awaits her at another financial institution, such as Bank of
America, Wachovia, or Wells Fargo. Indeed, the well-informed consumer
would know that all these banks suffered major data breaches in a single
year.'6 Under these conditions, a consumer might be reluctant to incur the
switching costs involved in terminating a bank account or credit card. Why
go to all this effort if there is a good chance at ending up no better off?
Consumers, therefore, face information imperfections, cognitive limita-
tions (how well will any lay person evaluate data security?), information
costs, switching costs (assuming that an alternative is available) and other
transaction costs. To foreshadow a final point, the notification letter itself
frequently comes in a form that may lead the consumer to discard the letter
without even opening it. We expand on this idea below under the concept of
"envelope triviality."
158. Eric Dash, Advertising: From Data Holders, Lots of Reassurance, N.Y TIMES, July 18,
2005, at C6.
159. Id.
160. Eric Dash, A Matter of (Fading) Trust: Banishing One Payment Processor Was Just the
Start for Visa, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at Cl.
161. Citi notifies 3.9 million customers of lost data, MSNBC.coM, June 7, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.comid/8119720/; see Associated Press, Bank data theft could hit more than
700,000, MSNBC.coM, May 23, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.con/id/7954620; US bank 'loses'
customer details, BBC NEWS, Feb. 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/430037 .stm.
162. Dash, supra note 158; see also Liz Moyer, Citi Whacked Again, FORBES.COM, June 6,
2005, http://www.forbes.com/services/2005/06/06/cxlm_0606citi.html.
163. Dash, supra note 158.
164. See supra Section I.A.
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B. The Ideal Consumer and Mitigation: From Self-Protection
to Automatic Protection
This Article now considers how an ideal consumer should act to avoid
harm from a breach that has already occurred. The California Office of Pri-
vacy Protection explains the protective goal of the California statute in these
terms: the law is "intended to give individuals early warning when their per-
sonal information has fallen into the hands of an unauthorized person, so
that they can take steps to protect themselves against identity theft or to
mitigate the crime's impact."' 65 This early warning function is, however,
largely ineffective at present.
1. The Shared Recommendations
What are the steps, according to current wisdom, that the consumer is to
take upon notification of an information leak? The FTC, the California Of-
fice of Privacy Protection, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Consumer
Reports, and various self-help guides (including Preventing Identity Theft
for Dummies) have independently made a similar set of recommendations of
best practices upon notification.1
66
The list of recommendations for the consumer upon notification turns
out to be short:
* Carefully monitor all accounts for suspicious activity;
* Request free credit reports from the three main credit-reporting
agencies;
* Place a fraud alert on one's credit file; and
* Contact the FTC to put a complaint into its ID Theft database.'
67
This information can be conveyed clearly and concisely, and it will be
highly salient because it accompanies news regarding a leak of one's per-
sonal information. If breach notification letters clearly conveyed these
recommendations and consumers trusted these letters, these missives would
have a highly positive effect. Next, we must consider whether the notice
needs to be particularized as well as the best practices for consumers inde-
pendent of a data leak.
165. CALIFORNIA PRIVACY OFFICE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64, at 5.
166. For the key sources, see MICHAEL J. ARATA, JR., PREVENTING IDENTITY THEFT FOR
DUMMIES (2004); CALIFORNIA PRIVACY OFFICE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64; FTC, TAKE
CHARGE: FIGHTING BACK AGAINST IDENTITY THEFT (2005); and ROBERT HAMMOND, IDENTITY
THEFT: How TO PROTECT YOUR MOST VALUABLE ASSET (2003).
167. ARATA, supra note 166, at 153--63; CALIFORNIA PRIVACY OFFICE, RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 64, app. 2 at 19; FTC, supra note 166, at 4-9; HAMMOND, supra note 166, at 97-108.
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2. Particularized Notice
The initial list of recommendations requires consumer notification, but,
at least generally, does not require knowledge of where a data breach took
place. A large set of notification-triggering personal information simply in-
volves name, date of birth, address, SSN, and other information that can
lead to identity theft. Knowledge of where this information was leaked may
not help the consumer protect herself. The consumer can monitor personal
accounts, request a credit report, place a fraud alert on her credit file, and
contact the FTC without specifically knowing it was her MasterCard as op-
posed to a Visa account that was hacked. Moreover, in breaches where no
B2C relationship exists, as was the case with ChoicePoint or CardSystems,
the consumer cannot pay extra scrutiny to or cancel any personal account.
Thus, this list seems, at least initially, to be consistent with use of Model
Three's ADI, which notifies consumers without sharing information about
the locus of a breach.
A significant limitation exists, however, on the ADI. Consumers. upon
receiving notice, will make certain guesses about where the breach oc-
curred. These guesses will, in many instances, be wrong. As we pointed out
above, many of the entities that have been subject to data spills do not have
direct relationships with consumers. These shadow entities, including the
firms that provide back-office services, may suffer breaches, but a customer
may not even know that these companies exist. To give another example, a
consumer with only one credit card is likely to assume that the breach oc-
curred at the issuing bank. The data leak may have actually occurred at the
entity that processed the credit card, or the online merchant where the indi-
vidual purchased goods.
In addition to this concern about false positives, consumers will have a
strong proprietary sense regarding their personal information. They will
want to know about leaks of their personal data and oppose the creation of
an ADI. As a political matter, such opposition is likely to doom creation of
• • 168
any anonymized disclosure organization.
3. Best Practices Independent of Notification
Finally, we must determine the best practices for consumers even when
there has been no data leak and notification letter. More generally, the or-
ganizations and self-help guides listed above make similar recommendations
regarding good housekeeping practices for consumers. The core list here,
once again, is short:
Shred correspondence that is no longer needed and contains fi-
nancial information and key identifiers (name, address, SSN, and
other identifiers);
168. A further reason for doubts about an ADI is the "private-to-public-information" argu-
ment. See infra Section mI.C.
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" Keep documents with identifying information in a secure loca-
tion;
" Opt out of pre-certification of credit card offers;
• Opt out whenever possible of data sharing by one company with
another.' 69
Ideally, a breach notification letter should also inform consumers of these
good housekeeping practices.
It is also worth considering the last two recommendations from the list.
Under current law, many kinds of information sharing take place unless a
consumer "opts out," that is, indicates a preference not to have her informa-
tion shared. 7 The benefit of opting out is to reduce the amount of one's
personal information that is in circulation. The result should be at least some
reduction in the risk of identity fraud.
It is particularly important that lawmakers reform the current practice of
requiring consumers to opt out of credit card pre-certification offers. Pre-
certification currently leads to the mailing of millions of credit card offers.
7
'
The circulation of these offers creates a target rich environment for identity
thieves who steal mail or search garbage for unshredded personal informa-
tion. The latter activity is known as "dumpster diving."'7 2 The Fair Credit
Reporting Act permits credit bureaus to share information about individuals
with credit-issuing entities unless the targeted consumer has opted out.
173
This law should be amended to block credit bureaus from sharing informa-
tion for pre-certification unless a consumer has agreed to this practice, or
"opted in."
4. Fuzzy Notification Letters Redux
In the previous section, we examined a set of problems that consumers
face in shopping for data security with information from breach-disclosure
letters. These shortcomings concerned both how consumers are ill-equipped
to negotiate for data security and how notification letters at their best cur-
rently provide only incomplete, discontinuous, and non-comparative
information about data security.
There are also significant problems that arise from the process of con-
veying information within the notification letters themselves. First, in
assigning the task of sending disclosure letters to commercial entities, the
169. ARATA, supra note 166, at 39, 50, 100; FTC, supra note 166, at 12-18; HAMMOND, supra
note 166, at 73-84; California Office of Privacy Protection, Top 10 Tips for Identity Theft Preven-
tion, http://www.privacy.ca.gov/sheets/cislenglish.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
170. E.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b) (2000) (preventing financial
institutions from sharing information with non-affiliated entities).
171. See BOB SULLIVAN, YOUR EVIL TWIN 75 (2004) (arguing that pre-certified credit applica-
tions are "an identity thief's best friend.").
172. ARATA, supra note 166, at 8.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 168lb(e) (2000).
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law inadvertently creates a new way for identity thieves to harm consumers.
Breach notification letters provide a new ground for "phishing." This term
refers to the sending of a message that falsely claims to be from an estab-
lished legitimate enterprise in order to trick an individual into surrendering
private information that can be used for identity theft. 74 Phishing attacks
already occur via e-mails that inform recipients of account breaches.'
Second, notification letters may seem insignificant because they are in-
distinguishable from junk mail. We call this problem, "envelope triviality."
After receiving a notification letter from ChoicePoint, for example, one con-
sumer reported that he almost threw the letter out unopened because he
"thought it was going to be a credit card solicitation or a reduced rate mort-
gage scam."'176 The Ponemon Institute's survey on data breach notification
found that over thirty-nine percent of respondents thought their breach no-
tice "was junk mail, spam or a telemarketing phone call."'177 Americans are
so inundated by various forms of junk mail that envelope triviality is a per-
manent condition. What good is a notice if the envelope is never opened?
Note as well that the debate about whether letters should be sent under an
"unauthorized access" or "misuse" trigger does not address this problem.
Finally, notification letters frequently have problematic content. The ini-
tial difficulty can be thought of as "content triviality," which is closely
related to envelope triviality. Just as we may discard a letter from a com-
mercial entity without reading it, once the letter is open, its content may
confuse us or bore us, rather than compel us to act. Indeed, ChoicePoint's
notification letters adopted a tone that suggested that the data spill in ques-
tion was not a big deal.17 More generally, the Ponemon Institute survey
found that "[a] majority of respondents [were] not satisfied with the quality
of the notification and communication process."'79 Complaints included dif-
ficulties in understanding the notice, a lack of adequate details in it, and
continuing confusion about "the facts of the incident even after receiving
notification of the breach.' ' 0
A further difficulty is that notification letters can contain recoimenda-
tions for self-protection that are phrased in passive, almost nonchalant
terms. 1 1 Current letters focus more on damage control for the breached en-
174. ARATA, supra note 166, at 118-19, 169-71.
175. Seeid. atll8-19.
176. Bob Sullivan, Data theft affects 145,000 nationwide, MSNBC.coM, Feb. 18, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6979897/ (quoting anonymous e-mail to MSNBC.com).
177. PONEMON INST., supra note 18, at 3.
178. See Letter from J. Michael de Janes, Chief Privacy Officer, ChoicePoint (Feb. 9, 2005),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cp-letter 020905.pdf; Letter from J. Michael
de Janes, Chief Privacy Officer, ChoicePoint (Feb. 25, 2005), available at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/choicepoint/cpjletter_022505.pdf [hereinafter Second ChoicePoint Letter].
179. PONEMON INST., supra note 18, at 3.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Second ChoicePoint Letter, supra note 178 ("You may request one free report
containing information from all three national credit reporting companies.").
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tity rather than convincing consumers to take appropriate steps. A better
notice would clearly state the action that consumers are to carry out and use
bullet points or other ways to convey the urgency of the requirement.
Receiving letters from a commercial entity, whether CardSystems,
ChoicePoint, or Citibank, may also raise consumer suspicions as to whether
another attempt is being made at a sales pitch-a suspicion that is not un-
founded. Some companies are making commercial solicitations in
disclosure letters and attaching hidden strings to some "free" offers. 1 2 As an
initial example, ChoicePoint has offered to sell consumers access to some of
their compromised information. 81 Other companies, such as Wells Fargo
and Washington Mutual, are charging a whopping $155.88 and $120 a year
respectively for credit monitoring and identity theft insurance.' 4 Given that
the maximum liability for unauthorized use of a credit card is $50,' and
that the practices of these companies play a role in permitting data breaches,
one wonders whether there are any limits to shamelessness (or chutzpah).
We also note that less incentive will exist for companies to improve data
security if data leaks become a new profit center for them. s6 Notification
letters are problematic, therefore, in the current context in which they are
being used.
C. The Ideal Data Processor: Private-to-Public Information and the
Improvement of Organizational Practices
Just as the ideal consumer is expected to engage in certain kinds of be-
havior regarding data security, the ideal data processing entity is expected to
take certain actions. Emerging legal authority, including statutes and regula-
tions, already points to a favored approach.17 As we have described,
applicable laws and regulations require businesses to utilize reasonable data
security procedures that are expressed in an enterprise-wide plan. We now
summarize the most important legal requirements in this area and then dis-
cuss how particularized breach notices can have a positive impact on the
data-handling practices of organizations.
182. Joseph Menn, Firms Hit by ID Theft Find Way to Cash In on Victims, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2005, at Al.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1) (2000).
186. This point was also made by one identity theft victim: "They're cashing in on this, so
there's no incentive to make it go away." Menn, supra note 182 (quoting attorney Mari Frank). For a
detailed account of how credit bureaus are now deriving "a fast-growing revenue stream" from
selling consumer information to consumers, see Christopher Conkey, Extreme Makeover, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 15, 2006, at B 1.
187. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B (2006) (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency regula-
tions for financial industry security issued by regulatory agencies pursuant to the GLB Act); HIPAA
Security and Privacy, 45 C.FR. pt. 164 (2005) (regulations for data security for "covered entities"
under HIPAA); Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 66 Fed.
Reg. 8816 (Feb. 1,2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 30).
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1. Notification and Reasonable Data Security
Companies ultimately are to use "any security measure" reasonably de-
signed to achieve reasonable data security."' This standard is also
supplemented with rules. Under a reasonable program for data security, a
business that processes personal information might:
* Conduct periodic risk assessments;
" Develop a data security program to manage and control these
risks;
" Assign one person at the company the responsibility for the se-
curity program;
" Apply sanctions against employees that fail to comply with the
security program;
" Implement procedures to review records of information security
activity and monitor the security program for effectiveness;
Engage in regular audits;
* Establish a password program for employees;
" Respond promptly to any unauthorized access to information;
" Reassess and modify the data security program in light of any
data breaches as well as any changes in overall risk.
These rules are expressed through guidelines in certain sectors and have
also been imposed on certain companies as part of FTC enforcement ac-
tions.
The law is placing more companies under an obligation to develop and
maintain reasonable data security procedures. What is the role of notifica-
tion under this approach? As we have seen in this Article's discussion of
consumer behavior, evidence suggests that consumers are not likely to be
effective in shopping for data security, or, as notification letters are currently
constituted, engaging in post-breach self-protection. Nevertheless, notifica-
tion has encouraged a flurry of positive indirect effects, including legislative
activity, intense media scrutiny, and new requirements for notification and
data security.' 90 Some companies have also improved their practices and
policies.' 9'
188. As Bruce Schneier states, data security is to be viewed as "a process, not a product."
BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD xii (2000).
189. E.g., HIPAA Security Standards, 45 C.ER. pt. 164.
190. For discussion of the intense public interest in the topic, see Krebs, supra note 7.
191. See, e.g., Moyer, supra note 162 (noting that CitiFinancial is now encrypting data that it
had previous sent unencrypted with courier services, such as UPS); CALIFORNIA PRIVACY OFFICE,
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64, app. 6 (reporting the results of a study by Dr. Larry Ponemon in
which one-third of the corporate respondents reported changes in intrusion detection systems, en-
cryption technologies, and the perimeter control process in response to California breach
notification statute).
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Thus, notification letters have already made a difference. But why have
the letters led to these positive changes? Developing an understanding of
how notification affects a data processor's behavior is important, moreover,
because it can point to ways to improve the process of notification and ame-
liorate data security. In our judgment, breach notification letters have two
important roles. One of these functions takes place outside the breached
firm, and one takes place inside it. The letters can transform information
about firm practices into publicly-known information as well as alter prac-
tices within an organization.
2. Private-to-Public Information
A notification letter contains information about the occurrence of a
breach, its specific dimensions, and even the existence of hitherto unknown
data processing businesses, such as data brokers.' 9' Particularized notice
allows consumers, the media, and legislators to hear a story about data secu-
rity gone awry. Forced to convey a certain kind of particularized bad news,
the breached entity becomes a focal point for consumer resentment, media
attention, and legislative scrutiny.
In short, breach notification letters transform private-sector information
usually kept confidential into public information. Other areas of law have
also adopted this technique.'93 Breach notification is a specific example,
moreover, of "regulation through disclosure," which Sunstein has termed
"one of the most striking developments in the last generation of American
law." 94 Despite information regulation in other areas, companies had kept
tight control of information about data security failures and other risk events
until enactment of the California breach notification law. As a specific ex-
ample, ChoicePoint had suffered an earlier breach that pre-dated the
California obligation to notify affected consumers.'" In the absence of a
legal duty to inform, however, the company kept public knowledge of the
incident to a minimum.' 96 As our previous discussion of the disclosure disin-
centive demonstrates, moreover, these entities have a powerful interest in
keeping this information as secret as possible.' 9'
Fortunately, notification letters have altered this situation and have cre-
ated a new stock of public information. This public knowledge is highly
salient. Consumers have a strong proprietary sense regarding their personal
192. See Robert Cooter, Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 373 (2006) (explaining that a general function of competition is to convert valuable private
information into public information).
193. For a pathbreaking discussion of different contexts in which consumers are given infor-
mation about a wide range of potentially hazardous products, see WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. Kip
VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION (1992).
194. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 613.
195. David Colker & Joseph Menn, ChoicePoint Had Earlier Data Leak, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2005, at C 1.
196. See id.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
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data and feel personally involved if this information is leaked."' Regarding
this sense of ownership, Money magazine speaks to its readers in these
terms regarding personal information held by data brokers: "It's your data,
after all; these guys just figured out how to sell it."'
99
The proprietary sense that Money magazine identifies is not one that the
law fully protects or recognizes.2 00 But in the context of data leaks, it is
enough, even in the absence of formal property rights, that most people be-
lieve that they have such a proprietary interest in their personal information.
As a result of this belief, the public information created by notification let-
ters has enjoyed a special resonance. Elected representatives, acting as norm
entrepreneurs, have, in turn, been eager to draw on this information and
public sentiment to propose new regulations.'
This movement of information from private to public is highly signifi-
cant. When consumers learn of data breaches that involve their own
information, they may not know what to do about the data leaks and may
not even take the steps that the breach letter suggests, but they will be sensi-
tized to the issue of data security. They may also be disturbed enough to
complain to their elected representatives, government agencies, and the me-
dia. The media, in turn, will investigate specific breaches, explore different
data processing industries and businesses, and publicize examples of organ-
izational misbehavior in data handling. As information about data security
breaches and industry practices becomes public, the public, media, and leg-
islators learn about the kinds of errors that lead to data breaches and the
types of mistakes that companies make. This situation creates an opportu-
nity for legislators to suggest new regulations and for governmental
agencies to provide pressure as to the appropriate content of existing legal
standards.
Thus, one large payoff of mandated breach disclosure is that it can trig-
ger legislative and other regulatory activity. This information can improve
both regulation and company practices. It also can help create an evolving
notion of the appropriateness of different practices, which will help shape
the content of the emerging reasonableness standard of data security law and
the interplay of this standard with any rules. One of the coauthors of this
article, Paul Schwartz, has already argued, in the context of the regulation of
voting technology, that a legal response to high tech areas is likely to require
198. This sense of involvement can add to emotional harm that sometimes follows an identity
theft. See IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, IDENTITY THEFT: THE AFERMATH 2003 35-39
(2003), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/idaftermath.pdf.
199. Pat Regnier, Are You Terrified About Identity Theft Yet?, MONEY, Sept. 2005, at 112, 116.
Consider as well this consumer comment upon being informed of the ChoicePoint data breach:
"[h]ow dare they even try to make money using my Social Security Number in the first place ...
Where did they get it from? I certainly didn't give it to them; I never heard of them before receiving
the letter." Sullivan, supra note 176 (quoting anonymous e-mail to MSNBC.com).
200. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2388-93 (1996).
201. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S7616-01 (June 29, 2005) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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both standards and rules.' °2 The other coauthor, Edward Janger, has argued
that in areas where technology is changing rapidly, such as the Internet,
common understandings about behavior are not yet formed, and standard-
based regulation may be required to allow courts and other decision-makers
sufficient flexibility to develop and articulate principles in a common law
fashion.'O In particular, ongoing public information about data leaks will
help to prevent the idea of a reasonable standard of data security from ossi-
fying and will encourage the revision of any rules.
3. Inside the Black Box
Breach notification letters also have the potential to improve practices
within the firm. These influences fall into three groups. Notification letters
have the potential to (1) create a credible threat of negative costs or other
punishments for the firm, (2) improve information flows within the firm,
and (3) strengthen the position of the CPO.
The requirement that notification letters follow upon a data breach
represents a highly significant compliance issue for a company and those
who work at it. As Ayres and Braithwaite suggest as part of their work on
enforced self-regulation, company performance improves significantly when
204
some kind of credible punishment lurks outside the company. One such
"big gun" is a post-breach notification letter. This threat has the potential to
improve performance across the board and to create ongoing pressure for
innovation.
To be sure, all security incidents are not created equal. All do not create
a firestorm of bad publicity. Moreover, consumers do not effectively use
notification letters to shop for data security. Nevertheless, the reaction of the
public, media, and government, and the consequences of these reactions will
be hard for companies to predict in advance. By and large, therefore, com-
panies will prefer to prevent negative publicity from data security breaches
whenever possible. It is thus plausible to view the threat of sending cus-
tomer notice as a "big gun" for regulatory purposes.
The breached entity faces costs in terms of managing the crisis, sending
notices (if this step is taken), and seeking to regain the trust of its customers.
Moreover, the customer notice creates an important feedback loop. The se-
curity breach becomes a news story in a way that anonymous notification
and dry statistics do not. As in the ChoicePoint incident, for example, details
regarding the breach may become part of the story. National media widely
reported the ChoicePoint story when notice had only been given to indi-
viduals who had been affected by the breach.2° ' The story was driven into
202. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 664-67.
203. Janger, supra note 32, at 1871-72.
204. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 72. at 25-27.
205. Joseph Menn and David Colker, More Victims in Scam Will Be Alerted-Choicepoint
says it will notify 110,000 people outside of California of the security breach, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2005, at Cl.
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the headlines at this stage by the hitherto unknown nature of the data-broker
industry, ChoicePoint's initial incredible assertions that non-Californians
were not implicated by the breach, and the company's obvious stonewalling
regarding other details of the incident2'6
The public nature of the ChoicePoint story ultimately made the company
a more attractive target for regulators who wished to act as policy entrepre-
neurs. In short order, the FTC pursued ChoicePoint and achieved a
settlement that included a multimillion dollar fine as well as carefully tar-
geted standards for improved firm behavior.0 7 If, as Ayres and Braithwaite
argue, the threat of severe sanctions assists government in its seeking of
regulatory compliance, the FTC action against ChoicePoint leaves regula-
tory agencies involved in data security compliance in a far stronger
position.
208
Beyond creating a credible threat of negative costs or other punishments
for the firm, a requirement of breach notification should improve the flow of
information about data security throughout a firm. A variety of organization
theorists have pointed out the extent to which the sharing of important in-
. 209
formation within companies can be suboptimal . One major problem, as we
have already seen in the context of consumer behavior, is information over-
load. As Malloy suggests, "[t]he environment in which most organizations
and the individuals within them operate is constantly buzzing with enor-
mous amounts of information and stimuli, generated both internally and
externally. ' '0 Thus, attention itself is a scarce resource, and the merit of
breach notification is that it represents a "big ticket" event that directs the
attention of an organization and the individuals who work at it. It identifies
data security as a clear priority.
Finally, breach notification letters should strengthen the position of
CPOs and executives with related positions within the firm. Different pro-
jects and different individuals compete for the attention of top firm decision-211
makers. A company faces significant baseline choices in deciding how
much to invest in data security compliance and where to locate CPOs in the
firm hierarchy. As the requirement of sending a breach disclosure letter is
extended to more firms, the internal significance of the CPO will be height-
ened. Moreover, as firm resources are increasingly devoted to data security,
the issue which the CPO oversees, the CPO should increasingly be able to
212gain the attention of high executives in the company.
206. Evan Perez, ChoicePoint is Pressed to Explain Database Breach, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25,
2005, at A6.
207. See supra text accompanying note 17.
208. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 72, at 40-47.
209. See RICHARD H. HALL & PAMELA S. TOLBERT, ORGANIZATIONS 148-53 (9th ed. 2005);
Bamberger, supra note 28.
210. Malloy, supra note 29, at 555-56.
211. See HALL & TOLBERT, supra note 209, at 95-98.
212. Similar issues regarding the internal significance of the CPO arise as well in Germany,
although the position and independence of the German equivalent of the CPO is explicitly protected
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IV. NOTIFICATION AND MITIGATION
This Article concludes by presenting its own model for responding to
data security breaches. Our Model Four seeks to go beyond simply inform-
ing consumers about security breaches; its goal is a coordination of the
breach response by different entities both to mitigate the harm from the
breach and to improve data security in the future. This model is a hybrid that
draws on the best aspects of the three approaches already discussed, while
avoiding, or at least minimizing, their weaknesses.
From Model One we learned that particularized customer notices serve
an important role in making private information about security breaches and
security practices publicly available. From Model One we also learned,
however, that these notices rarely cause customers to change their behavior,
and that these notices do little to mitigate harm flowing from the breach.
Finally, from Model One we learned that the threat of particularized notice
creates significant perverse incentives. Because notice of a security breach
harms reputation and might also give rise to liability, data processing entities
have an incentive to resist disclosure.
From Model Two, we learned about the possibilities of supervised dele-
gation and of an institutionally supported coordinated response. Yet on its
face, the Interagency Guidance leaves the decision to notify customers en-
tirely in the hands of the breached entity. This Model, as embodied in the
Interagency Guidance, is incomplete. It leaves open important questions
about the role of both consumer and agency notification. For example, while
the Interagency Guidance invokes a two-tiered standard for consumer and
agency notification, it does not specify the manner of notification or the
possibility of the oversight agency ordering notification when the data proc-
essor's investigation is insufficient or the results inconclusive. Similarly, the
Interagency Guidance is silent about the actions that oversight agencies are
supposed to take with information about security breaches which they re-
ceive through "first tier" notices. Should they maintain statistics? Should
they communicate with other agencies? Should they communicate with
other financial institutions?
Finally, from Model Three, we learned that breach notices serve two dis-
tinct functions that are often in tension with each other: reputational
sanction and mitigation. The goal of reputational sanction creates a signifi-
cant disincentive to disclose breaches, while the mitigation function
generally gains little from the identification of the source of the breach.
Nonetheless, Model Three's approach has significant costs. Particularized
notice serves the benefit of transforming private information into a stock of
public knowledge that is highly salient; it eliminates the problem of false
positives; it sensitizes the public to data security issues, fuels media investi-
gations, and creates pressure for regulation and oversight; and, as such, it
can help improve internal firm practices.
by statute. See generally Spiros Simitis, Beauftragter fir den Datenschutz, in KOMMENTAR ZUM
BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ § 4f (Spiros Simitis ed., 6th ed. 2006).
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A. Model Four: The Coordinated Response Architecture
Model Four develops a coordinated response architecture that seeks both
to mitigate harm from breaches and to improve data security to prevent
breaches. The key attributes of this architecture are: (1) supervised delega-
tion of the decision whether to give notice, (2) coordination and targeting of
notices to other institutions and to customers, (3) tailoring of notice content,
(4) minimized data retention and decentralization, and (5) enforcement
through both encouragement (carrot) and coercion (stick) of the data proc-
essing firm. Central to the architecture is a coordinated response agent
(CRA) that oversees steps for automatic consumer protection and heightens
mitigation. We begin the description of this Article's own approach, its
Model Four, and the idea of the coordinated response architecture by de-
scribing the CRA and then turning to the nature of the particularized notice
that will be sent to consumers.
1. Supervised Delegation and Coordinated Response
Model Four contemplates a bifurcated notice scheme similar to that con-
tained in the Interagency Guidance: notification to the consumer follows
upon a reasonable likelihood of "misuse" of notification-triggering informa-
tion, and notification to the CRA requires a reasonable likelihood of
"unauthorized access." This model differs from the current state trend,
which, as we have noted earlier, generally follows the California model and
relies on a simple "acquisition" standard. A small group of states have
adopted a higher standard, that is, a more stringent one than California's, but
no state has yet followed the path of the bifurcated notice scheme that this
Article develops.
The initial disclosure would trigger a duty to investigate and report to
the CRA. In consultation with the affected entity, the CRA would then de-
termine whether there was a likelihood of misuse of the information. This
two-tiered and interactive approach lets firms know that the CRA is watch-
ing and will scrutinize their decision whether or not to disclose information
about a breach to the affected individuals . 3 It also increases the information
that flows into a coordinated system for mitigation of breaches. In a nut-
shell, the CRA will coordinate the sharing of information about data
security breaches, oversee the response of private sector entities to them,
and supervise the decision of breached entities whether or not to disclose to
consumers.
The CRA will also coordinate the notification effort. Here, a key point is
that different notices serve different purposes. For example, the goal will be
mitigation when the breached entity notifies the FTC and private credit-
reporting agencies. In contrast, notice to individual customers will be
shaped to allow customers to protect themselves as well as to make private
213. For a general discussion of the merits of such supervised delegation, see Bamberger,
supra note 28.
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information public. As such, the content of these various notices may differ
based on the circumstances and the types of breaches. The CRA's role will
be to supervise and coordinate rather than to store personal information or
engage in notification of breached individuals.
In some regulatory areas, elements of these functions are already carried
out by the FTC, the federal financial oversight agencies, and state attorneys
214general. The proposed "Red Flags Rule" of the Department of Treasury
and other federal agencies overseeing financial institutions offers a particu-
larly intriguing example of information sharing to assist governmental
oversight."' This regulation calls for information about "changing identity
theft risks to customers and to the financial institution or creditor as they
arise" to be part of a Red Flag list that the regulated organization main-
tained.216
Under the Red Flags Rule then, the organization and government would
have access to information about emerging incidents and methods of iden-
tity theft. Similarly, New York and North Carolina require entities that send
breach notifications to their customers also to inform the respective state
217
attorney general's office. Much more should be done, however, in these
states to make this information publicly available. As in the Red Flag Rule,
there is wisdom in making information about breaches accessible and giving
multiple parties the chance to interpret the raw data and develop strategies to
stop data leaks based on lessons from this information. More can also be
done in the Red Flag Rule and these state approaches to introduce the ele-
ment of coordinated response. In general, moreover, there is still no central
entity that orchestrates notification and mitigation subsequent to a breach.
While there is a need for an entity in charge of coordinating actions after
any particular breach, this Article also advocates flexibility regarding the
different forms that a CRA might take. Although we speak of the CRA in
the singular for simplicity purposes, its functions need not be centralized in
any one stand-alone agency. In some circumstances, multiple agencies
might carry out its tasks with benefits from this decentralization. A modest
first step for the law would be to increase the powers under the Interagency
Guidance of the different financial regulatory agencies in order to permit
them to become CRAs with the powers that this Article sets out. Some of
the functions of the CRA might even be delegated to the private sector and
self-regulatory entities."'
214. See supra Section II.B.
215. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies under the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,786 (proposed July 18, 2006).
216. Id. at 40,791.
217. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa (8)(a) (McKinney 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65(f)
(2005).
218. In tightly integrated industries, such as the securities business or banking, sometimes key
participants are privately able to create coordinated structures that serve their needs. Similarly, pri-
vate check clearinghouses might create their own data security and security breach regimes that
might also have entities capable of serving as coordinated response agents in that industry. There
are, nonetheless, risks to delegating too much authority to private entities. See Donna M. Nagy,
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At the same time, however, certain core CRA functions should belong
exclusively to a government agency, at least under current conditions of the
law and the data security market. These functions are those related to the
need for credible threats of enforcement. A government agency-whether
the FTC, financial oversight agencies, state attorneys general, or similar en-
tities-is to be responsible for any ordering of notification or assessing of
penalties.
By coordinating the sharing of information about security attacks with
different organizations, the CRA is in a position to minimize the harm
caused by the security leak without compromising the investigation. At pre-
sent, there is an ad hoc approach to sharing information about data leaks.
For example, the Los Angeles Police Department task force had jurisdiction
over the investigation of the ChoicePoint incident but lacked authority to
share relevant information with other data brokers or other governmental
220
regulators. In sharing information nationwide with law enforcement enti-
ties, other regulators, and even other companies, the CRA will increase the
relevant knowledge base among the public and government entities.
In addition to coordinating the breached entity's internal investigation
and its notification process, the CRA will set in motion automatic protective
measures on behalf of the breached consumer. By statute, it will be author-
ized to request that (1) credit reports be sent to the consumer, (2) a fraud
alert be placed on the consumer's credit file, and (3) information about the
circumstances of the breach be placed in the FIC's identity theft database.
Banks independently came to a similar conclusion regarding the wisdom of
this last measure in July 2005 and agreed to share their data on identity theft
221directly with the FTC.2 Yet, other breached entities at present do not share
such information with any governmental entity. Having these measures take
place without consumer action would both reduce the individual time spent
responding to breach letters and heighten the amount of information about
data breaches brought into the overall response system. Thus, in broad
terms, the CRA will supervise the investigation into data security breaches,
coordinate the sharing of information about these incidents, and orchestrate
the systemic response to them.
2. Tailoring Notice to Consumers
The CRA will play an essential role in determining when and whether
notification letters are sent to consumers. The CRA will also regulate the
content of the notification in light of the nature of the data breach. To avoid
customer confusion and to hold the entity accountable, the notice should in
Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 975 (2005).
219. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 72, at 40-47.
220. Perez, supra note 206.
221. Joris Evers, Banks to share ID theft data with FTC, CNET NEWS.COM, July 6, 2005,
http://news.com.conVBanks+to+share+ID+theft+data+with+FTC/2110-7348_3-5777098.html.
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most cases identify the source of the breach. The notice will also state the
protective measures that consumers should take to avoid identity theft.
Moreover, these letters will detail certain automatic steps already taken to
protect consumers, both internal, such as flagging accounts, and external,
such as notifying credit reporting agencies and the FTC about the breach.
This information will save the consumer time and inform them of FTC and
other resources that are available. These letters will encourage consumers to
engage in individual monitoring of whether these actions have, in fact, been
carried out by the breached entity. Finally, notification will instruct consum-
ers how to monitor their own accounts using the resources available.
The CRA will not only mandate certain content, but also will prohibit
certain conduct by the breached entity. First, notification letters are often
confusing and unclear; consumers may also confuse the letters with either
222junk mail, or, worse yet, phishing by fraudsters. The CRA can take steps
to combat concerns about both activities. In this area of rapid technological
change, the CRA's goal should be to develop notification approaches while
allowing industry groups to develop their own requirements. By permitting
the development of self-regulatory guidelines and requiring them to be sub-
mitted to it for approval, the CRA will encourage both individual companies
and the industry as a whole to develop innovative means to overcome the
current weaknesses in notification.
Second, breached entities frequently use notice letters as an opportunity
to market their own data security products. A statutory prohibition should
block the marketing of commercial products and the making of solicitations
in breach notices. As an example of this approach, the Specter-Leahy Per-
sonal Data Security and Privacy Bill of 2005 prohibits a breach notification
from including: "(1) marketing information; (2) sales offers; or (3) any so-
licitation regarding the collection of additional personally identifiable
information from an individual. 223
3. Minimizing Additional Data Storage and Decentralization
A key aspect of the CRA is that it is designed to function without itself
handling or storing much, if any, personal information. One of the great co-
nundrums when seeking to structure a governmental role in responding to
data security breaches is that the coordinating agency itself may become a
repository of large amounts of personal data and, thereafter, a target for
hackers.
To avoid this risk, the CRA will be designed around the principle of data
224
minimization. Consistent with this approach, it will draw on the resources
222. See supra text accompanying notes 174-175.
223. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1332, 109th Cong. § 423(c) (2005).
224. See generally Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 707, 740 (1987) ("Personal information should only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. Both government and private institutions should abstain from collecting and retrieving
data merely for possible future uses for still unknown purposes.").
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of existing data repositories rather than create its own new databases of per-
sonal information. For example, various credit-reporting agencies already
maintain fraud watch lists. The CRA would not gather information about
people subject to a breach, but would instruct the breached entity to com-
municate with the credit-reporting agencies. It would also coordinate
investigations, oversee decisions made by breached entities of whether or
not to send notification (though it would not send the notices itself), and
help regulate the content of notices. Finally, the CRA would prepare com-
parative statistical information regarding data security events. This last
activity is consistent, for example, with the governmental role, explored by
Sunstein, in compiling statistical information along different dimensions to
225provide an overall measure of the national well-being.
The creation of comparative statistical information will be useful on
three levels. First, it will give the CRA and other government agencies the
ability to distinguish good data security actors from bad ones. Over time, the
government will be able to gain a better sense of the good and bad apples.
Second, the comparative information will provide companies with a credible
basis-a track record-for evaluating their data security and that of the rest
of the pack. If an entity engages in damage control by buying advertise-
ments that tout its security efforts, these claims will be more easily
subjected to a reality check. Finally, such data will be useful in improving
the consumer-side data security marketplace. These statistics would provide
consumers with better comparative information about data security prac-
tices.
4. Enforcement and the Disclosure Disincentive
As for the disclosure disincentive, Model Four seeks to overcome it
through judicious use of both carrot and stick. First, as the carrot, Model
Four offers companies a chance to avoid consumer notice by early reporting
to and cooperating with the CRA. As the stick, Model Four adopts the Cali-
fornia statute's private right of action for failure to disclose and sets
-" 226
statutory damages of $500 for each failure to notify. As noted earlier, most
state statutes do not take this approach-only three states currently provide
227for a private right of action. Model Four also draws on another important
aspect of the Specter-Leahy Bill. This bill suggests a particularly strong al-
ternative response to the disclosure disincentive. It creates criminal penalties
for any company official who intentionally and willfully conceals the fact of
a security breach for which the law requires individual notice to be given.
228
A CPO of anything but a rogue organization is unlikely to run the risk of
these criminal penalties.
225. Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1994).
226. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(c) (West Supp. 2006).
227. See Appendix.
228. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1332, 109th Cong. § 103 (2005).
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Finally, regarding the law enforcement delay, the CRA can do much to
keep any postponement of notification as short as possible and to limit the
harm that it causes. Once information about a breach is shared with both the
CRA and law enforcement officials, two things will happen. First, the CRA
is to monitor the investigation, and second, since it has an interest in disclo-
sure, it must ensure that the law enforcement delay is no longer than
necessary. It can see that the delay is kept to an explicit short period, such as
thirty days, unless investigators certify to the CRA in writing the special
229
circumstances that require further delay.
B. Unpacking Model Four
Having described our coordinated response architecture, we will con-
clude by fleshing out a few of its key attributes in greater detail, explicating
a few of our choices, and, in particular, demonstrating how our model of
supervised delegation, coordinated notice, and decentralization will foster a
culture of compliance with data security norms.
1. Reputational Information
Model Four retains particularized notice as the norm, but adopts Model
Three's anonymized disclosure as a tool in the limited situations where its
benefits outweigh its costs. This decision is made notwithstanding the fact
that the reputational sanction functions in an uncertain fashion at best when
particularized notice occurs under Models One and Two. As a consequence,
not much will be lost should consumers lack access to reputational informa-
tion.
These concerns must, however, be balanced against some costs that re-
sult from anonymous disclosure. Consumer opposition to Model Three's
ADI--due to a proprietary sense regarding personal information-is likely,
as a political and practical matter, to make this approach infeasible in most
contexts. 2' ° A further concern with the ADI is that it would stifle transforma-
tion of private-to-public information and block outside pressure capable of
improving behavior of the firm. Also, under Model Three, the general pub-
lic, the media, and the legislative branch would lack knowledge of the
specifics of data leaks. The ADI might thereby cut off the flow of important
information into the public sphere and squelch nascent and, indeed, neces-
sary reforms of data security. Anonymous disclosure may also cause false
231positives through a likely misallocation of guilt by inference. Most indi-
viduals will be likely to blame their bank or credit card issuer rather than
some unseen entity, such as a data aggregator, payment processor, or
229. The Specter-Leahy Bill has a similar requirement. Id. § 422(c).
230. See supra Section III.C.
231. Individuals who receive non-particularized breach disclosure letters will nevertheless be
likely to draw conclusions about the culprit's identity. See supra Section III.B.
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data-storage company--or a lower profile entity, such as a typical bricks-
and-mortar retailer.
2. Supervised Discretion
Model Four initially assigns the decision to disclose to the breached en-
tity, but uses the CRA to limit and supervise this exercise of discretion. In
this regard, Model Four follows the path of Model Two with a raised thresh-
old (likelihood of misuse) for consumer disclosure, but a low threshold
(unauthorized access) for disclosure to the CRA. While the higher threshold
in isolation raises the possibility that a firm might use its power to investi-
gate as a mechanism for stonewalling, Model Four, like Model Two,
requires notification of a government agency, the CRA, on a lower track.
This second track provides an early warning as well as a check on the firm's
discretion whether or not to disclose to consumers.
In short, our view is that delegated discretion functions best when there
is an ongoing dialogue between the firm and an agency. As Bamberger sug-
gests generally, "Decision-makers can step outside existing knowledge
structures when external stimuli prompt them to devote attention to particu-
lar situations they confront, to account for unexpected information, and to
consider unfamiliar implications.""' Model Four creates a way for such test-
ing of existing "knowledge structures" within the firm.
The CRA oversees the decision whether or not particularized notice
should be given to the consumer. It provides rolling regulatory inputs re-
garding the form that notice should take. It is also worth stressing that
industry self-regulation, without these regulatory inputs, has proven ineffec-
tive thus far. As one example, Visa requires merchants that use its payment
cards to meet its security standards. However, Visa acknowledges that only
fifteen percent of the 215 largest retailers that accept its cards can certify
that they meet the current standards.233 Visa and MasterCard are also in talks
to develop a private group that will establish and administer new industry-
wide security standards.) Our hope is that with the CRA looking over the
industry's shoulder, any new self-regulatory proposals for tightened data
235
security will have not only public relations bark, but also some actual bite.
As two data security experts have stated regarding the need for a govern-
ment role in oversight of the payment card industry, "A reminder that there
is a cop on the beat for those who do not adhere to reasonable security pro-
232. Bamberger, supra note 28, at 446.
233. Dash, supra note 40.
234. Id.
235. Id. Concerning shortcomings of existing self-regulation by the payment-cards industry,
consider the B.J. Warehouse Club data breach, see BJ's News Release, supra note 41, and the
CardSystems incident, see Eric Dash, Take a Number: How Electronic Thefts Revealed the Vulner-
abilities of Payment Systems, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at Cl.
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cedures will be a good message for the industry."23 6 Finally, Model Four
takes some decisions off the table by refusing to delegate them. For exam-
ple, legislation should prohibit any marketing within a breach-disclosure
notification.
The CRA can serve an important role in solving the boy-who-cried-wolf
problem, that is, the problem of consumers deluged with breach notices who
decide to ignore them rather than take steps to protect themselves. It can
ensure that notices are only sent when there is a risk of misuse of personal
information. Moreover, it can help shape the content of notification letters to
overcome the problem of content triviality. The CRA can help to see that
clearly worded letters, or a combination of letters and telephone messages,
inform affected consumers of a breach. A recent survey by the Ponemon
Institute has indicated positive results in terms of consumer comprehension
following combined means of notification.237 More can also be done to make
genuine notification letters distinguishable from phishing.238 Finally, shifting
to more automatic protection will help overcome the concern about con-
sumer inaction as a consequence of too many notification letters.
Thus, this Article recommends the higher "likelihood of misuse" stan-
dard for consumer notification. We think that this standard will go a long
way to reduce the danger of information overload. To return to the boy who
cried wolf, the villagers may not need constant reminders that wolves are
eyeing the sheep, or even that the shepherd has blocked attempted incur-
sions. Rather, the villagers need to know when there is an open risk of a
specific threat. Imagine that the shepherd wished to protect the sheep by
calling on reinforcements from the villagers when necessary. This shepherd,
in his role of the office of sheep security, would inform the villagers only of
real attacks by wolves. He would not merely cry "wolf," but would describe
the wolf's physical characteristics and the direction he was coming from,
and provide other detail sufficient to advise the villagers of how best to pro-
tect the endangered sheep. This information is far from trivial, and the cry of
"wolf" would not be shrugged off when presented in this manner.
236. Mark MacCarthy & John Shaughnessy, Payment Card Industr. Data Security Standard,
in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY 16-39 (Christopher Wolf ed., 2006).
237. PONEMON INST., supra note 18, at 8-9.
238. There are two related problems here. If the notification is sent by snail mail, there is a
risk that the communication will be confused with junk mail, such as unwanted credit card solicita-
tions. If the notification is sent by e-mail, there is an even greater risk that it will be confused with
phishing. A strategy that might help a CRA to overcome these problems is to send particularized
notice along with a bill or other communication that contains sufficient information, perhaps about
the account at the entity, to unambiguously indicate that the communication is from an authentic
sender.
This solution does not help, however, where a "shadow entity" is involved, and here there is
also a greater risk that the customer will likely ignore the communication because of the lack of an
existing B2C relationship. In reaction, the notice from a shadow entity might be sent by a govern-
ment agency or a credit-reporting agency whose correspondence would not be ignored by a
consumer. It is important, however, that, consistent with our goal of data minimization, the notice
should be sent only by an entity that already has sufficient data (for example, name and address) to
send out the notice.
March 2007]
Michigan Law Review
In other words, a key function of the CRA will be to ensure that con-
sumers will not be informed except when the information about a breach
will be useful to them or, more generally, to society. Moreover, we think that
a lower standard for sharing information with the CRA will have the consid-
erable benefit of increasing the overall information flow into it.
In the context of breach notification, the level of required supervision
will turn on both the type of data processing entity involved and the type of
data that has been stolen. We expect that entities directly subject to market
forces, such as financial entities and B2C businesses, may prove more likely
to cooperate with the CRA and, hence, more likely to disclose and investi-
gate fully. By contrast, shadow entities like ChoicePoint may be likely to
require more intrusive regulation-at least until government regulators use
one or more "big gun" sanctions.
3. Coordination of Post-Breach Mitigation Efforts
In addition to overseeing the discretion of breached entities in deciding
when to notify and regulating the content of breach notices, the CRA may
help to determine who should receive notice and when. For example, as-
sume that a financial institution discovers that an unauthorized party has
gained access to a series of credit card numbers, expiration dates, and ac-
count holders' names. Such data can be used to make fraudulent charges on
those particular accounts. At that moment, the institution may not know if
the access was obtained by somebody who poses a risk (a thief), or merely
an employee who should not have gained access but who will only make
appropriate use of the data. The firm would naturally flag such accounts at
its own institution, but under Model Four, it will also be required to notify
the CRA.
The CRA will then take a number of actions. Its immediate concern will
be making sure that the entity was conducting an investigation to gather
more information about the nature of the security incident and the extent of
any open risks. As more information comes in about the institution's inves-
tigation, the CRA might want to contact law enforcement in order to start
outside attempts to identify and apprehend any wrongdoer. It might also
wish to contact the FTC, credit-reporting agencies, and possibly other insti-
tutions or private entities in the same or related industries as the breached
organization. At this juncture, the CRA might also permit a short delay in
notifying customers. The coordinated nature of the response should help
minimize harm to the account holder.
4. Delay to Allow Investigation before Consumer Notification
This Article has pointed to a law enforcement delay as possibly height-
ening a lag in consumer detection of identity theft. The ADI had the posited
benefit of being able to reduce or even eliminate the law enforcement delay.
The idea was that anonymous notification might take place simultaneously
[Vol. 105:913
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with a law enforcement investigation. While anonymous disclosure may
sometimes be feasible and promising, we have also pointed to reasons why
even anonymous disclosure may leave organizations still reluctant to share
information with an ADI. This Article's preference is to develop a coordi-
nated response architecture to keep postponement of notification as short as
possible and to minimize any harm from this delay.
5. Provision for Damages and Other Enforcement Rights
As we have noted, Model Four adopts the California statute's private
right of action for failure to disclose and sets statutory damages of $500 for
each failure to notify.24° The threat of class action lawsuits is likely, however,
to exert a heavy force on companies to admit data leaks.
6. The Culture of Compliance
The notice-based approach of the California breach notification statute
represents an important step toward creating a widespread corporate culture
that takes data security seriously. The fear of reputational sanction is an im-
portant motivator, and we recognize its value. Similarly, the Interagency
Guidance's mandating of a CPO and its requirements of risk assessments
and response programs are important steps in creating norms within corpo-
rate entities with regard to data security.
In our view, moreover, Model Four and the CRA will build on this exist-
ing jurisprudence to create a more comprehensive and more nuanced culture
of data security and customer notice. This Article advocates an approach
that will provide greater ability to mitigate the harm associated with security
breaches while also being sensitive to how businesses operate. One of the
most attractive aspects of our coordinated response architecture is that it
puts in place a system that has the capacity to learn from successes and fail-
ures, whether those of itself or others. CRAs will be repeat players in the
world of security breaches, and commercial organizations will be repeat
141players with their respective CRAs. Over time, these parties will learn
what works and what does not. There will be accumulated wisdom, for ex-
ample, about the forms of notice that work best, and the parties who should
be notified at once when certain kinds of breaches occur.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the response architecture is just
that-an organizing structure. It allocates responsibility and accountability,
but remains open to gathering and sharing knowledge about particular prac-
tices with participants in the process of providing data security. In our view,
these practices should evolve over time as technology and commercial
239. See supra Section III.C.
240. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(c) (West Supp. 2006).
241. For a theoretical discussion of the importance of repeat play in political institutions, see
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 159-88 (1994). For a concrete application
of the implications of repeat play, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 177-83 (1991).
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practices change. Such evolution is permitted, if not guaranteed, by the
presence of standards in the emerging law of data security and breach notifi-
cation. As technology develops and then fails in unexpected ways,
overarching standards are available to plug gaps in more specific rules. The
resulting dynamic mixture of standards and rules permits a flexible devel-
opment in the resulting pattern of legal commands.
CONCLUSION
Data security is a topic of almost daily headlines, and one that is garner-
ing great attention from legislators. The current level of awareness is largely
a function of state statutes that mandate consumer notification of security
breaches and federal regulation of financial institutions. This Article evalu-
ates the two main existing legislative models regarding mandatory consumer
notification and finds that both have notable strengths and weaknesses.
Model One, as reflected in the California breach notification statute, sets a
low threshold for consumer notice (a reasonable belief of "acquisition" of
leaked information) and has the advantage of narrowing business discretion
as to whether or not to notify consumers. With regard to reputational sanc-
tions, it has the further benefit of ensuring that information about breaches
will be publicly disseminated. And, regarding the mitigation of harm, this
standard has the potential of providing consumers with information to allow
self-protection.
There are also disadvantages to this paradigm. Model One does not re-
spond to the disclosure disincentive, envelope triviality, or content triviality.
Companies may seek to avoid notification of consumers. In turn, consumers
may not open notification letters or act on their information because they are
already overwhelmed by communications from commercial entities and the
letters themselves do not convey their content effectively. As such, the let-
ters as currently constituted may not provide particularly useful information
about a company's security practices, or about the steps customers should
take to protect themselves from harm. Finally, beyond these threats, to the
extent that these letters are intended to help people shop for data security,
consumers are likely to be bad at making choices on the basis of such non-
price information.
Model Two, as embodied in the Interagency Guidance, establishes two
tracks for notification. It has a high threshold for consumer notification (a
reasonable belief of "misuse" of leaked information), and a low threshold
for notification of the oversight agency (a reasonable belief of "acquisition"
of leaked information). The advantage of this regime vis-a-vis Model One is
chiefly that it contains a formal mechanism for involving a governmental
entity in supervising the response to a data security breach. The chief com-
parative disadvantage of Model Two is that to the extent that it gives
businesses discretion for notification, it will permit foot-dragging and ob-
fuscation instead of prompt disclosure.
Model Three, our thought experiment based on comments of the Chi-
cago FRB, has an almost entirely different set of strong and weak points. On
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the plus side, it may be able to overcome the disclosure disincentive by
withholding the identity of the breached entity. The sacrifice of the reputa-
tional sanction may also help with mitigating the harm from a data breach.
If the ADI does lead to greater overall information about data leaks flowing
into the system, it can facilitate a coordinated response by sharing informa-
tion about the security breaches with other business entities, and, in
anonymous form, with consumers.
While the costs of anonymous disclosure will often outweigh its bene-
fits, this thought experiment demonstrates why particularized notification
matters-and it is not the reason usually offered. Particularized disclosure
alone is not likely to do much to perfect the market for data security. In-
stead, notification letters that name the breached entity serve to change the
status of information from private to public knowledge and create positive
pressure on organizational practices.
Important benefits flow from this transformation. The first occurs as
consumers and the media learn of data breaches and an opportunity is cre-
ated for norm entrepreneurs, including legislators, to suggest new
regulations and approaches. The second benefit is the pressure that is then
placed on businesses to improve their practices. The third benefit is greater
awareness of the kinds of errors that lead to data breaches and the types of
mistakes that companies make. This information can improve the quality of
regulation and company practices. The fourth benefit is that this public in-
formation will shape legal notions of practices that are consistent with a
reasonable standard for data security.
In response to the strengths and weaknesses of these three models, this
Article has proposed a coordinated response architecture. In Model Four, an
independent organization balances the reputation-based function of notice
against the goal of mitigating harm. In brief, this model limits the disclosure
disincentive and overcomes the boy-who-cried-wolf problem. Consumers
should receive information about data security leaks, but in a fashion that is
useful to them. The legal system should do far more to protect them from
the harms that flow from data breaches.
March 2007]
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:913972
z
0
0
z
u
u
W
Notification of Data Security BreachesMarch 2007]
974 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:913
Notification of Data Security Breaches 975March 20071
976 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:913
Notification of Data Security Breaches
m~ . ~
2. E 2 Eo
E-ww .8
a.? 8 1 -,.E
J =U ma
8 ~ C.o E
CO
0 E 0C
LU wC =i 8.
March 2007]
Michigan Law Review
E 2 E C
*0E 5
-0 W
E2 02 T 0
0) .= CL
~a ~ .- 0 00
~t Ef.0 s
~~~ 4-~
~-
Us 0co
0)0~-0 0h.0
en ~ 2..
z0 2 2~0
[Vol. 105:913
Notification of Data Security Breaches
ce
I
0
CSA
.2~, ~.g .2
>2'
.252
w.~o
A
E) S2 00 cc 0 0~sl a 2
T0 12 o 
0
*0 4 '0)0
30: E- Ao ZE. E
- ).
~0
o o-
0 M.
o i u
0) o
4 4 n
A Z 2:
March 2007]
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:913
Notification of Data Security Breaches 981March 2007]
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:913
Notification of Data Security BreachesMarch 2007]
984 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:913
.0
o -
o,
C) 
0
as. 0
C >1 .0
a-
0= 0
._ -
E .
03 .
r~ g
~0
., 
- 0
c0~
.r C.
